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Buy, Sell, or Hold?  
ANALYST FRAUD FROM ECONOMIC AND  
NATURAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 
Ronald J. Colombo† 
INTRODUCTION 
What are the fundamental purposes of U.S. securities 
regulation? To foster efficient capital markets? To protect the 
individual investor? To promote virtue in the securities 
industry? The question is an important one, as its answer 
ought to frame the legislative, regulatory, and judicial 
responses to the numerous issues and challenges confronting 
the field of securities law. By ignoring the full set of 
fundamental purposes of securities regulation, we run the risk 
of fashioning remedies inconsonant with the regulatory regime 
and hence more likely to undermine, rather than promote, a 
consistent, coherent approach to securities regulation. This 
Article posits that not all the fundamental purposes of U.S. 
securities regulation have been honored equally. Moreover, this 
Article suggests that a way of recapturing respect for the full 
range of aims that gave rise to the U.S. securities laws is to 
replace (or at the very least augment) the prevailing analytical 
approach employed in securities law thinking (namely, that of 
law and economics) with a different approach (namely, that of 
natural law theory).  
If one looks at the inspiration behind the 1933 and 1934 
Securities Acts, one quickly finds that, contrary to popular 
belief and the focus of current scholarly wisdom, the promotion 
of virtue and the extirpation of vice were central to both the 
President’s and Congress’s conceptualization of these acts. 
Indeed, it was understood and expected by President Roosevelt 
and the 72nd Congress that the promotion of virtue in the 
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securities industry would best serve to protect the individual 
investor and resuscitate the capital markets.1  
Today, very few understand the securities laws as did 
President Roosevelt and Congress in the 1930s. Perhaps the 
single most influential reason for the divergence of today’s 
understanding of securities regulation and the understanding 
of its progenitors is the successful advance of “law and 
economics” thinking, which has come to dominate many fields 
of study, most especially those concerning economic regulation. 
For, under law and economics thinking, the seemingly 
subjective concerns of morality and normative values are 
displaced by the seemingly objective concerns of economic 
reasoning.2 
The successful advance of law and economics should not 
be surprising given today’s diverse, pluralistic society in which 
it is difficult to achieve consensus on arguments that are moral 
or normative in nature. 3 For law and economics purports to put 
aside those things over which individuals disagree and instead 
to focus on those things upon which individuals can agree: that 
efficiency should be preferred to inefficiency and that societal 
wealth should be maximized.4  
Despite the appeal of law and economics, the movement 
has had its detractors. One line of criticism levied against it is 
that law and economics elevates a societal means (namely, 
efficient laws) over more ambitious (and more important) 
societal ends. Put differently, law and economics is viewed as 
deficient in failing to recognize that law does not exist for its 
own sake, but rather to further greater societal goals, such as 
the common good. Although individuals might disagree over 
what these goals should be, the whole enterprise of using law 
to achieve such goals should not be abandoned.5 
The second line of criticism takes an opposite tack. To 
these detractors, law and economics’ shortcoming is not that 
the movement divorces law from normative ends, but rather 
that law and economics substitutes the traditional normative 
ends of law with its own norms and values: namely, those of 
  
 1 See infra Part III.A. 
 2 See Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics Is Moral, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 
163, 166-73 (1990). 
 3  Cf. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981) (arguing that Western 
Civilization no longer possesses a means of resolving disputes of an ethical or moral 
nature). 
 4 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 2, 166-73. 
 5 See infra notes 243–244 and accompanying text. 
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the free market. That is, the problem is not that law and 
economics is “value neutral,” but rather that law and economics 
is heavily value laden (with efficiency and wealth maximization 
serving as its primary values).6 
Whatever deficiencies law and economics may suffer 
from, it is not unfair to demand, as its proponents often do, 
that discourse over law and public policy be on terms that are 
based on reason and logic (such as the terms of economic 
reasoning), rather than on feelings and opinion (which are 
often the bases, actual or perceived, of moral and normative 
arguments).7 Therefore, the challenge to those who would 
confront law and economics from a normative or moral 
perspective is to provide objective, reason-based justifications 
for such a perspective. I suggest that natural law theory 
provides a philosophical framework, if not the philosophical 
framework, most up to this challenge.  
A thorough elucidation of the merits of natural law 
reasoning per se is beyond the scope of this Article. (Moreover, 
others have effectively done this.) Instead, this Article 
examines what the application of natural law thinking to 
securities regulation would accomplish. This Article shall 
demonstrate that the application of natural law thinking to 
securities regulation generates results that hew more closely to 
the original intent of the securities laws than do those 
generated via a law and economics approach. Thus, on at least 
this ground, natural law reasoning can be proclaimed as the 
superior analytical approach to securities regulation. Moreover, 
as stated previously, application of natural law reasoning to 
securities law issues can also serve as a means of restoring 
respect for an original, driving objective of the Securities Acts 
that has largely been forgotten: to help mold a more virtuous 
securities industry.  
This Article shall utilize a specific securities law 
problem to illustrate the promise and potential of a natural law 
approach to securities regulation: research analyst conflicts of 
interest. Part I of this Article sets forth the background to this 
particular problem, reviewing the role of research analysts and 
identifying the conflicts in question. Part II discusses why the 
primary antifraud mechanism of the securities laws (Rule 
10b-5) is inadequate to address this problem, hence prompting 
  
 6 See infra note 219. 
 7 See Posner, supra note 2, at 166-73. 
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calls for (and attempts at) other solutions. After reviewing the 
goals and values of U.S. securities law in general, Part III 
proceeds to analyze the solutions (proposed and potential) to 
the analyst problem, first from a law and economics perspective 
and then via a natural law approach. A juxtaposition of these 
two approaches reveals that the insights and solutions offered 
by natural law reasoning are superior to those offered by an 
economic approach to the law because, at a minimum, they are 
more harmonious with the complete set of goals and values 
that define the U.S. securities regulatory regime.  
I. BACKGROUND 
The research analyst conflict-of-interest scandal has led 
to increased litigation concerning, and regulation of, these 
specialized market participants. Research analysts, who issue 
widely followed research reports recommending whether a 
particular security should be bought or sold, were found to 
have issued reports and recommendations inconsistent with 
their own true opinions. Additionally, most analysts failed to 
disclose in their research reports the existence of substantial 
conflicts of interest that could reasonably be expected to 
influence their recommendations. Investors, relying on these 
reports and recommendations, claimed injury by virtue of their 
purchase of a misrepresented or overpriced security (which 
subsequently declined in value). This Part of the Article shall 
explain more fully the role of research analysts within the 
securities industry, the nature of their conflicts of interest, and 
the nature of their misconduct as alleged by investors and 
regulators. 
A. The Role of Research Analysts 
The U.S. Supreme Court has remarked that research 
analysts are “necessary to the preservation of a healthy 
market.”8 The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
has similarly observed that “[t]he value to the entire market of 
[analysts’] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in 
pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret 
out and analyze information, and thus the analyst’s work 
  
 8 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983). 
2007] A NATURAL LAW ANALYSIS OF ANALYST FRAUD 95 
redounds to the benefit of all investors.”9 What exactly do 
research analysts do that is so important?  
Research analysts “perform research and analysis on 
companies in order to evaluate securities and estimate their 
value as investments.”10 This research and analysis is then 
typically presented in a report, along with a recommendation 
regarding whether the covered company’s security should be 
bought, sold, or held.11 “Sell-side” analysts, who comprise about 
a third of all analysts, are typically employed by brokerage 
firms or investment banks.12 These analysts produce their 
research reports for their firm’s customers and other investors, 
ordinarily free of charge and/or contingent upon a certain 
minimum level of investing with the analyst’s firm.13 As a 
result, the information produced by sell-side analysts becomes 
“widely disseminated in the financial markets.”14 The 
dissemination of this information is valuable to the investing 
  
 9 Id. at 658 n.17 (quoting SEC’s brief, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1406 (1981)) 
(alterations in original). 
 10 Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking 
the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1040 (2003). 
 11 Id. at 1040-41. As Professors Fisch and Sale explain in detail: 
In theory, [research analysts] serve as information conduits . . . between the 
companies they investigate and actual or potential investors in those 
companies. Their work involves collecting and processing information from a 
variety of sources, both inside and outside of the company. As a result of their 
research, analysts typically produce two products: a “report” and a 
“recommendation.” In the report, analysts offer facts and opinions about the 
subject company and its securities. The recommendation, which is generally a 
selection from a series of rating categories, advises the investing public to 
buy, sell, or continue to hold the securities in question . . . . Analysts read and 
digest company reports and other secondary sources, speak with company 
officers and employees, and, where appropriate, visit company sites to help 
them form an independent impression of the business. Analysts review 
company documents filed with the SEC . . . and secondary sources like 
Standard & Poor’s that compile, summarize, and republish it. Analysts also 
may review trade publications, including industry-specific magazines. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also John Jacob, Steve Rock & David P. Weber, Do Analysts 
at Independent Research Firms Make Better Earnings Forecasts? 7 (July 2003), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=434702. 
 12 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1040-41. There are other kinds of 
analysts, such as “independent analysts” (who are not associated with investment 
banks and who sell their research to the investing public) and “buy-side analysts” (who 
provide their research to the investment banks that employ them, and not to investors 
or the public at large), but these analysts do not share the same conflicts that sell-side 
analysts do. See id. at 1041 & n.18. Thus, independent and buy-side analysts are not 
the focus of this Article and, unless otherwise indicated, the terms “analysts,” 
“securities analysts,” and “research analysts” shall be used interchangeably in 
reference to sell-side analysts alone. 
 13 See id. at 1040-41.  
 14 Id. at 1041. 
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public not only insofar as individual investors might rely 
directly upon the analysis or recommendations contained in a 
particular analyst’s reports,15 but, moreover, insofar as the 
dissemination of this information contributes to the efficiency 
of the market, thereby helping to foster the accurate pricing of 
securities.16  
B. The Conflicts of Interest 
As indicated, sell-side analysts are typically employed 
by brokerage firms or investment banks.17 Since it is the desire 
of such firms to attract and retain investment banking clients, 
institutional pressures toward this end unsurprisingly come to 
bear upon sell-side analysts.18 This is problematic because 
investment banking clients (current and potential) can be 
expected to favor positive research coverage over accurate 
coverage, and thus analysts are pressured to skew their reports 
  
 15 See Robert P. Sieland, Note, Caveat Emptor! After All the Regulatory 
Hoopla, Securities Analysts Remain Conflicted on Wall Street, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 531, 
544 (2003).  
 16 See Kelly S. Sullivan, Comment, Serving Two Masters: Securities Analyst 
Liability and Regulation in the Face of Pervasive Conflicts of Interest, 70 UMKC L. REV. 
415, 424 (2001); see also Robert Brooks & Huabing Wang, The Securities Litigation 
Reform and Its Impact on Analyst Research 7-8 (2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=606822 (setting forth results of a study that “highlights 
analysts’ role as an information intermediary in the financial market, especially when 
information in the market tends to be complex” and how such a role is “increasingly 
important” following the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995); Fisch & 
Sale, supra note 10, at 1061 (referring to the work of the sell-side research analyst as a 
“public good”). This understanding is grounded upon the efficient market hypothesis, 
which, in its widely applied “semi-strong” form, theorizes that “stock price will 
incorporate all publicly-available information relevant to the valuation of the stock.” 
See Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public Offerings, 10 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 85, 97 n.59 (2006); see also Robert J. Shiller, From the Efficient 
Market Theory to Behavioral Finance 4 (Cowles Found. Discussion Paper No. 1385, 
2002), available at, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=349660. Thus, the more 
information of relevance regarding a security that is made available to the market, the 
more accurately that security’s price will reflect its value. See Richard C. Strassner, 
How Much Information Is Enough: Securities Market Information and the Quest for a 
More Efficient Market, 5 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 5, 9-12 (2003).  
 17 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 18 See Barbara Moses, They Were Shocked, Shocked: The “Discovery” of 
Analyst Conflicts on Wall Street, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 89, 97 (2004); see also Fisch & Sale, 
supra note 10, at 1045-54. Investment banking clients typically include companies 
seeking to raise capital via the sale of securities to investors. This business—
underwriting—is highly lucrative because the investment bank selected to lead the 
underwriting sales effort typically earns a fee of approximately 7% of the total amount 
of equity securities sold in the underwriting. See George J. Papaioannou & Adrian 
Gauci, Deregulation and Competition in Underwriting: Review of the Evidence and New 
Findings, 5 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 47, 59 (2006). 
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in a positive direction.19 A textbook conflict-of-interest case 
arises: on the one hand, the analyst is expected to produce a 
fair, objective research report for the benefit of investors, but 
on the other hand the analyst has an interest in producing a 
report that portrays the covered company in a positive light in 
order to generate (or maintain) lucrative investment-banking 
revenue for the benefit of his or her firm.20 
And the conflict in question is not just theoretical—its 
existence, and its effects, have been empirically demonstrated.21 
“According to the SEC, downgrades [in analyst 
recommendations]22 occurred in only 1% of the securities 
covered for the year 2000.”23 Some firms adopted official policies 
forbidding analysts from “making negative or controversial 
comments” about investment banking clients.24 Further still, 
many firms linked an analyst’s salary, and/or the analyst’s 
bonus, to his or her contribution to the firm’s investment 
banking business.25 As Laura Unger, then acting Chairwoman 
of the SEC, testified before Congress on July 31, 2001: 
First, an analyst’s salary and bonus may be linked to the 
profitability of the firm’s investment banking business, motivating 
analysts to attract and retain investment banking clients for the 
firm. Second, at some firms, analysts are accountable to investment 
banking for their ratings. Third, analysts sometimes own a piece of 
the company they analyze, mostly through pre-IPO share 
acquisitions.26 
Thus, structural conflicts of interest exist for many analysts, 
and several have clearly allowed their research to be affected 
by these conflicts.27 An investigation of Merrill Lynch, for 
example, revealed an analyst who publicly recommended 
certain securities for purchase, but privately described these 
  
 19 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1047. 
 20 See id. 
 21 See, e.g., Moses, supra note 18, at 95-99; Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 
1047-54. 
 22 That is, where an analyst changed a recommendation from more favorable 
to less favorable. 
 23 Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1047. 
 24 Id. at 1049.  
 25 See id. at 1052-54; see also RICHARD ROBERTS, WALL STREET 60 (2002). 
 26 Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage Firms and Their Research 
Analysts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 
(2001) (testimony of Laura S. Unger, Acting Chair, SEC), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/073101ortslu.htm. 
 27 See infra text accompanying notes 28-29. 
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same securities as “junk”;28 an analyst at Salomon Smith 
Barney who rated an issuer as a “buy” was discovered to have 
indicated to two colleagues that the company was a “pig” and 
should instead be rated “underperform.”29 
C. Claims Against Research Analysts 
While the market was performing favorably in the 
1990s, relatively scant serious attention was paid to the issue 
of analyst conflicts of interest.30 Even less litigation was 
generated over the issue.31 But as the market began to falter in 
1999, and as stock prices began to drop, analysts became the 
focus of scrutiny and litigation.32  
The New York Attorney General, the SEC, the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), the New York 
Stock Exchange, and the North American Securities 
Administrators Association all launched investigations into the 
conduct of research analysts, which resulted in a “Global 
Settlement” among the regulators and ten Wall Street firms.33 
Under the terms of the settlement, “the settling firms agreed to 
pay a total of approximately . . . $875 million in penalties and 
disgorgement . . . , $433 million to fund independent research, 
and $80 million to fund and promote investor education.”34 
  
 28 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1049. 
 29 See Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 711, 757 (2005). 
 30 See Moses, supra note 18, at 97-98. 
 31 See id. 
 32 See Jill I. Gross, Securities Analysts’ Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest: 
Unfair Dealing or Securities Fraud? 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 631, 631-33 (2002); see 
also Moses, supra note 18, at 97-104. 
 33 See Moses, supra note 18, at 99-103; see also SEC Launches Inquiry into 
Research Analyst Practices, 7 No. 22 Andrews’ Bank & Lender Liab. Litig. Rep. 11 
(May 16, 2002). 
 34 Moses, supra note 18, at 102-03. Additionally,  
the Global Settlement requires the brokerage firms to insulate their research 
analysts from investment banking pressure by: (i) physically separating the 
departments; (ii) requiring senior management to determine the research 
budget without input from investment banking; (iii) prohibiting any 
investment banking role in evaluating analysts or determining their 
compensation; (iv) requiring the managers of the research group alone to 
make all decisions to initiate or terminate company-specific coverage; and (v) 
keeping analysts out of ‘beauty contests’ and roadshows. In addition, the 
firms agreed to purchase independent research from at least three outside 
firms, to furnish that research to its customers for the next five years, and to 
make its own analysts’ historical ratings and price forecasts publicly 
available in order to enable investors to compare analyst performance 
throughout the industry. 
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Additionally, by November 2002, “over 150 securities 
fraud class actions were pending against Merrill Lynch alone, 
based primarily on analyst conflict-of-interest allegations.”35 
These actions were typically brought under section 10(b) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 
promulgated thereunder, which “prohibits fraud in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a security.”36 The crux of these 
complaints is that an analyst’s failure to disclose conflicts of 
interest constitutes a material omission and/or that an 
analyst’s publishing of a disingenuous opinion constitutes a 
material misstatement.37 This, in turn, renders the analyst’s 
research report(s) false or misleading, and thereby constitutes 
a fraud in connection with plaintiff’s purchase of the security 
(or securities) that are the subject of the research report.38 
What makes these cases particularly interesting is that, in 
many ways, they test the limits of existing securities law.39 
II. ANALYST LIABILITY UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS 
A. Rule 10b-5 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
prohibits the use of “any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance of such rules and regulations as the Commission 
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors” in connection with 
the purchase or sale of a security.40 SEC Rule 10b-5, 
promulgated pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, has been the principal mechanism by which investors have 
challenged the alleged misrepresentations and/or omissions in 
research reports.41 Although multiple theories of liability can be 
formulated pursuant to Rule 10b-5 (such as liability on the part 
of those who “employ any devise, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud,” or who “engage in any act, practice, or course of 
  
Id. at 103. 
 35 Id. at 104. As of November 2007, a large number of these have been 
settled. See Cohen Milstein Hausfeld & Toll, Securities Fraud/Investor Protection, 
Merrill Lynch Co. and Henry Blodget,  http://www.cmht.com/cases_merrilllynch.php. 
 36 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006); see also Moses, supra note 18, at 104. 
 37 See Moses, supra note 18, at 104-05. 
 38 See id. at 105. 
 39 See id. at 114-15; see also Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1057-58. 
 40 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2000). 
 41 See supra text accompanying note 36.  
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business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person”42), the primary means by which alleged 
analyst misconduct has been challenged has been via the 
assertion of liability based upon “misstatements or omissions” 
within the context of a private right of action, and thus this 
shall be the focus of this Article.43 Additionally, this Article 
shall assume that all of the factual information contained in an 
analyst’s report concerning the covered issuer and security is 
accurate and complete. This is because, as commentators have 
pointed out, the issue of liability for false factual information 
contained in a research report (such as misstating the revenue 
of a covered company) is not a particularly difficult one to 
resolve.44 Furthermore, this assumption allows one to focus on 
the more difficult questions of analyst liability arising from  
(1) misstatements concerning the analyst’s opinions and 
recommendations as set forth in his or her report, and/or (2) 
omissions concerning the analyst’s conflicts of interest.  
To state a valid claim for violation of Rule 10b-5 based 
upon a misstatement or omission, a plaintiff must allege that 
the defendant “(1) made a misstatement or omission, (2) of 
material fact, (3) with scienter, (4) in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities, (5) upon which the plaintiff 
relied, and (6) that reliance proximately caused the plaintiff’s 
injury.”45 These elements of Rule 10b-5 liability shall be 
examined in turn.46 With regard to omission-based liability, 
this section shall also briefly examine whether an analyst must 
  
 42 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). 
 43 See Moses, supra note 18, at 105. The theory of these lawsuits is as follows: 
When analysts, with the intent to gain business through manipulation of 
security prices, yield to the pressures of investment banking conflicts, they 
have perpetrated fraudulent activity in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities. . . . Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and its 
corresponding Rule 10b-5 make these behaviors unlawful. 
Sullivan, supra note 16, at 427. 
 44 See, e.g., Shirli Fabbri Weiss, Securities Analysts in Securities Class 
Actions, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1999, at 431, 454 (P.L.I. Corp. Law and Practice 
Course Handbook Series No. 1136, 1999). 
 45 Kevin P. Roddy, Eight Years of Practice and Procedure Under the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL 
SECURITIES LAW, at 141, 177 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course No. SK027, 2004). It should also be 
noted that in an enforcement action undertaken by the SEC, the elements of reliance 
and loss causation need not be demonstrated. See SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 711 
(6th Cir. 1985). 
 46 The jurisdictional requirement that defendant made “use of any means or 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange” shall be assumed. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).  
2007] A NATURAL LAW ANALYSIS OF ANALYST FRAUD 101 
owe a duty to a plaintiff in order for that plaintiff to maintain a 
Rule 10b-5 cause of action.47 As shall be seen, there are 
significant ambiguities concerning the application of Rule 
10b-5 to analyst misconduct. 
1. Misstatement or Omission 
The first element of a Rule 10b-5 claim is that the 
defendant in question made a misstatement or omission.48 
Despite the oft-repeated characterization of Rule 10b-5 liability 
as simply pertaining to “misstatements or omissions,”49 the 
actual text of Rule 10b-5 does not impose liability upon 
“misstatements” or “omissions” generally, but rather upon “any 
untrue statement of material fact” or the omission of “a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made . . . not misleading”:50 
It shall be unlawful . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading . . . .51 
The omission in a research report of a statement revealing an 
analyst’s conflicts of interest would certainly constitute the 
omission of a “fact.” With regard to misstated opinions, 
however, this text provides some difficulty in that it requires us 
to consider whether an analyst’s opinion or recommendation 
could ever constitute an “untrue statement of . . . fact.”52 
As opinions are, by definition, not statements of fact, it 
could seem to follow, a fortiori, that an analyst’s opinions 
(including his or her recommendations) could not, by definition, 
constitute an untrue statement of fact.53 However, at issue is 
  
 47 See infra Part II.A.7. 
 48 See Roddy, supra note 45, at 177. 
 49 See id. 
 50 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. (emphasis added). 
 53 See, e.g., In re Boston Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 8 F. Supp. 2d 43, 64 (D. Mass. 
1998) (“[A] ‘recommended’ or ‘buy’ rating is not actionable because opinions generally 
do not provide sufficient basis for 10b-5 liability. . . . A recommendation or rating by an 
independent securities firm is the purest of opinions.”) (citation omitted); see also 
Wright v. IBM, 796 F. Supp. 1120, 1124-25 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (stating that “actions for 
violations of the federal securities laws typically may not be predicated on mere 
opinions or projections,” although acknowledging that “the recent trend . . . has moved 
toward recognition of an expanding range of opinions and projections as potentially 
actionable”); see also Moses, supra note 18, at 112. 
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not the correctness of the analyst’s opinion or recommendation 
per se, but rather whether what is set forth as the analyst’s 
opinion or recommendation is truly the analyst’s opinion or 
recommendation. That is, although an opinion is not the same 
thing as a statement of fact, whether or not an individual 
possesses a particular opinion is itself a factual question.54 
Thus, to the extent that an analyst declares that “my opinion  
is x” or “my recommendation is y,” he or she is fairly 
characterized as making a factual assertion as to what his or 
her opinion or recommendation is.55 While some courts have 
held that “analysts’ optimistic statements can be actionable if 
not genuinely and reasonably believed,”56 others “have found 
that recommendations and statements in analysts reports are 
inactionable statements of opinion.”57  
The U.S. Supreme Court grappled with the actionability 
of disingenuous opinions, albeit within the context of proxy 
solicitation, in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg.58 In 
Virginia Bankshares, plaintiffs alleged that defendant’s proxy 
solicitation materials were materially misleading in violation of 
§ 14(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.59 The bases of 
plaintiffs’ allegation in Virginia Bankshares were statements 
contained in the proxy solicitation materials regarding 
defendant’s directors’ stated beliefs that (1) minority 
shareholders would receive a “fair” price and “high” value for 
their shares under the terms of a merger proposal under 
consideration, and that (2) the directors recommended adoption 
of the merger proposal for these reasons.60 Plaintiffs alleged 
that these statements did not reflect the directors’ true beliefs, 
  
 54 See Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch.D. 459, 483 (Ch. App. 1885) (“[T]he 
state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion.”). 
 55 See In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that a “projection or statement of belief contains at least three implicit factual 
assertions,” including the assertion that “the statement is genuinely believed”); see also 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295 (1892) (acknowledging that 
one’s state of mind can be “a material fact to be proved”) (non-securities law context); 
Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg., 248 F. 853, 856 (2d Cir. 1918) (Hand, J.) (“An 
opinion is a fact. . . . When the parties are so situated that the buyer may reasonably 
rely upon the expression of the seller’s opinion, it is no excuse to give a false one.”) 
(non-securities law context). 
 56 Weiss, supra note 44, at 441; see also Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1083 
(recommending “a rule that treats analyst recommendations as factual statements and 
holds analysts accountable if they do not actually believe those statements”). 
 57 Weiss, supra note 44, at 454; see also supra note 53. 
 58 501 U.S. 1083 (1991). 
 59 Id. at 1086-87. 
 60 Id. at 1088.  
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hence rendering the proxy literature materially misleading.61 
The Court concluded that although both such statements were 
indeed “factual”62 (as well as material63), they would only be 
actionable under § 14(a) if they could be deemed to “expressly 
or impliedly assert[] something false or misleading about” their 
underlying subject matter.64 That is, “disbelief or undisclosed 
motivation, standing alone” was deemed “insufficient to satisfy 
the element of fact that must be established under § 14(a),”65 
but a falsely presented opinion coupled with “something false 
or misleading in what the statement expressly or impliedly 
declared about its subject” would be actionable under § 14(a).66 
The Court resisted the recognition of liability “on mere disbelief 
or undisclosed motive without any demonstration that the 
proxy statement was false or misleading about its subject,” 
noting that it would not permit litigation “confined solely to . . . 
the ‘impurities’ of a director’s ‘unclean heart.’”67  
Virginia Bankshares, then, recognizes the correct 
characterization of feigned opinions and/or recommendations: 
such statements are properly deemed untrue statements of 
fact. However, Virginia Bankshares adds to the complexity of 
the issue by proceeding to hold that, even though factual, such 
statements are nevertheless not necessarily actionable per se 
(at least within the context of § 14(a) actions). Whether the 
reasoning of Virginia Bankshares will be applied to research 
analysts statements challenged under Rule 10b-5 (and, if so, 
how) remains to be seen. If it were applied, actions against 
analysts who issued otherwise-accurate reports containing 
misstated opinions might be characterized as grounded upon 
“mere disbelief,” and thus not capable of entitling plaintiffs to 
relief. On the other hand, a better argument could be made in 
favor of the proposition that an analyst’s opinion “impliedly 
asserts something false or misleading” about the underlying 
security itself, and is not, therefore, properly characterized as 
  
 61 Id. at 1088-89 
 62 Id. at 1092. 
 63 Id. at 1090-91. 
 64 Id. at 1096. 
 65 Id. at 1090-91. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. The Court acknowledged that “it would be rare to find a case with 
evidence solely of disbelief or undisclosed motivation without further proof that the 
statement was defective as to its subject matter.” Id. Nevertheless, the Court felt it 
important to circumscribe liability in such cases given that “the temptation to rest an 
otherwise nonexistent § 14(a) action on psychological enquiry alone would threaten . . . 
strike suits and attrition by discovery.” Id.  
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merely a statement of personal belief divorced from the subject 
matter at issue (that is, the covered securities). This is because 
a “buy” rating, for example, impliedly—if not expressly—
asserts that the security in question is going to perform well, 
regardless of the analyst’s own personal beliefs. Under such a 
line of reasoning, the analyst’s false opinions would be 
actionable as per the logic of Virginia Bankshares.    
2. Materiality 
“A fact is material if it is substantially likely that the 
fact would be viewed by a reasonable investor as significantly 
altering the ‘total mix’ of information available, and if there is 
a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
consider it important to the investment decision.”68 As the 
continuum of potential misstatements and omissions is a long 
one, the question of materiality is ordinarily considered a 
question of fact.69  
In some instances, however, the question of materiality 
would seem resolvable as a matter of law. For example, it is not 
difficult to imagine a misstatement or omission that would be 
immaterial as a matter of law by virtue of its marginality, such 
as an opinion that is only slightly exaggerated or a conflict that 
is quite attenuated. A more interesting question is whether 
even egregious misstatements of a research analyst’s opinion, 
or the omission of very clear and serious conflicts of interest on 
the part of the analyst, might be properly considered 
immaterial as a matter of law. Put differently, perhaps, as a 
matter of law, analyst opinions and analyst conflicts should be 
deemed per se immaterial.70 For it is not altogether obvious that 
a reasonable investor could ever view an analyst’s opinion as 
“significantly altering” the “total mix” of information available 
regarding a given security or company. In the case of an 
analyst’s opinion in line with those of all (or most) other 
analysts, how would such a redundant opinion “significantly 
  
 68 Roddy, supra note 45, at 178; see also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
231-32 (1988) (adopting as materiality standard for Rule 10b-5 the standard previously 
set forth by the Court within the proxy solicitation context in TSC Industries, Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
 69 See Roddy, supra note 45, at 178. 
 70 As one court observed: “a statement of opinion emanating from a research 
analyst is far more subjective and far less certain [than a statement of fact from an 
issuer], and often appears in tandem with conflicting opinions from other analysts as 
well as new statements from the issuer.” DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243, 
246-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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alter” the “total mix” of information available? With regard to 
an outlier opinion by an analyst, how could an outlier—by 
definition, almost—ever be viewed as significantly altering the 
total mix of information available? And, if the opinions of 
covering analysts are split as to a particular security or 
company, again, how could the opinion of one additional 
analyst significantly alter the total mix of information? 
Regarding an analyst’s failure to disclose his or her 
conflicts of interest, the general presumption has been that 
such an omission would be material71 and, consequently, 
actionable under Rule 10b-5.72 The prevailing assumption 
notwithstanding, the conflation of “materiality” with 
“actionability” is suspect. A strict textual analysis of Rule 10b-5 
reveals that not every omission of a material fact is unlawful, 
but rather only the omission of “a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading” is 
unlawful.73 The type of omission contemplated by Rule 10b-5, 
then, would be one in which a communication states that the 
company should perform well next year on account of an 
expected doubling of revenue, without mentioning that a 
tripling of expenses is also expected.74 Omission of information 
concerning an analyst’s conflicts of interest, however, does not 
so clearly make the other statements in a research report 
misleading. Courts and commentators have not generally 
focused on this issue, but, as indicated, have rather presumed 
that so long as the omitted information is material, its 
  
 71 See Sullivan, supra note 16, at 428 (2001) (“Based on the assumption that 
conflicts of interest influence the objectivity of research reports and recommendations 
made by analysts, conflicts of interest appear to be factors that the reasonable investor 
would consider when making an investment decision.”). 
 72 See Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970) 
(“[F]ailure to inform the customer fully of its possible conflict of interest, in that it was 
a market maker in the securities which it strongly recommended for purchase . . . was 
an omission of a material fact in violation of Rule 10b-5.”). 
 73 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). 
 74 See, e.g., Wallace v. Sys. & Computer Tech. Corp., No. 95-CV-6303, 1997 
WL 602808, at *11 n.30 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1997). 
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nondisclosure is unlawful under Rule 10b-5.75 This presumption 
may be unwarranted.76  
Additionally, assuming that all the underlying facts 
concerning the covered company and security are complete and 
accurate, are not reasonable investors armed with all the 
information they need to make an investment decision, 
regardless of the analyst’s own opinions, recommendations, and 
biases? And is this not especially the case if, as in many cases, 
investors rely upon their brokers’ advice (who apply expertise 
in sifting through research reports and other market 
information) in deciding upon which securities to buy, sell, or 
hold? And what if, added to this information, the report also 
fully discloses whatever conflicts of interest the analyst has? 
Would this tip the materiality balance regarding misstated 
opinions in favor of immateriality? A strong argument could be 
made that it would.77 And arguments such as these (albeit 
outside of the specific context of research analyst reports) have 
led to the development of the judicially crafted “bespeaks 
caution” doctrine,78 which Congress codified, in limited form, as 
a safe harbor under the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act, 79 each of which is addressed below. 
a. Safe Harbor of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act 
In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), which includes a “safe 
harbor” provision eliminating liability for certain forward-
looking statements.80 The applicability of the safe harbor 
provision on analyst reports is uncertain.81  
  
 75 But see In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 277 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“A determination that information missing from a registration statement is material 
does not end our analysis. We must also decide whether the issuer had the duty to 
disclose that material fact such that its omission made the statement misleading.”). 
 76 Of course, failure to disclose a conflict of interest would be actionable 
under Rule 10b-5 if the research report affirmatively touts its objectivity. See Shah v. 
Meeker, 435 F.3d 244, 248 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 77 But see DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(noting that empirical evidence suggests that “some research analysts may have the 
ability to influence market prices on the basis of their recommendations”). 
 78 Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 71 (1999). 
 79 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 80 Id. at § 102 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5). 
 81 See Weiss, supra note 44, at 442-44. 
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By its terms, the safe harbor excludes as a basis of 
liability “any forward-looking statement” that is either 
immaterial or, more importantly, is “accompanied by 
meaningful cautionary statements identifying important 
factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from 
those in the forward-looking statement.”82 Thus, it appears as 
though the PSLRA’s safe harbor could provide a “Joe Isuzu”83 
defense for research analysts who issue reports containing 
biased, exaggerated, or otherwise dishonest opinions and 
recommendations, but who also include in their reports 
accurate and complete information regarding the covered 
company and its securities, as well as an accurate and complete 
disclosure concerning whatever conflict(s) of interest the 
analyst has (for this information and disclosure, properly 
presented, would arguably constitute “meaningful cautionary 
statements identifying important factors that could cause 
actual results to differ materially from those” expressed in the 
analyst’s opinions and recommendations).84 Indeed, “Congress 
specifically intended that application of the safe harbor should 
be determined without any inquiry into the defendant’s state of 
mind.”85 However, the utility of the safe harbor to lying 
analysts would be limited if one takes the position that the only 
  
 82 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2000). The safe harbor provision also excludes from 
liability forward-looking statements regarding which scienter cannot be proven, but 
because of the disjunctive nature in which the safe harbor was drafted, the question of 
scienter need not be reached if the conditions regarding “meaningful cautionary 
statements” are satisfied. Id.  
 83 “Joe Isuzu” was a fictional salesperson, portrayed by actor David Leisure, 
in a television ad campaign launched by American Isuzu Motors, Inc. in the mid- 
1980s. See Cullen Thompson, Isuzu Case Study (Nov. 26, 2000), available at 
http://www.unc.edu/~cullent/isuzu.html. In the commercials, Joe Isuzu “would say 
anything to get consumers to buy his car” and “outright lied to his audience.” Id. 
However, as he was doing this, “the words ‘He’s lying’ ran across the bottom of the 
screen followed by the actual facts.” Id. 
 84 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1). I am assuming here that an analyst’s opinion 
regarding the future prospects of a particular security is indeed a “forward-looking 
statement” as that term is understood under the safe harbor. 
 85 John F. Olson et al., Recent Developments in Disclosure and Dealing with 
Analysts and the Financial Press, in POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES 
LAW, at 313, 346-47 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course No. SE10, 1999). See also Brooks & Wang, 
supra note 16, at 4 (noting that Senator Joseph Biden remarked that the PSLRA’s safe 
harbor grants corporations “a license to lie”). But see ROBERT J. HAFT & MICHELLE H. 
HUDSON, LIABILITY OF ATTORNEYS AND ACCOUNTANTS FOR SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS § 
7.5 (2005) (“Many commentators believe that the courts will not protect the 
dissemination of knowingly false statements accompanied by literally compliant 
cautionary statements.”); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. 
Supp. 2d 549, 576 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (“The safe harbor provision does not apply where 
the defendants knew at the time that they were issuing statements that the 
statements contained false and misleading information . . . .”). 
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disclosure capable of constituting a “meaningful cautionary 
statement[]” with regard to an analyst’s misstated opinion 
would be one indicating that the research analyst was, in fact, 
misstating his or her opinion.86 
Another question concerning the availability of the 
PSLRA safe harbor is whether its limited applicability even 
extends to research analysts. For the safe harbor only applies 
to forward-looking statements made by (1) an issuer; (2) a 
person or entity acting on the issuer’s behalf; and (3) “an 
underwriter, with respect to information provided by such 
issuer or information derived from information provided by 
such issuer.”87 The only category into which a research analyst 
might reasonably fall is the third.  
Although an analyst’s report is based largely on 
information “provided by [an] issuer” and/or “derived from 
information provided by [an] issuer,” whether the analyst 
constitutes an “underwriter” is far from clear.88 The term 
“underwriter” in the PSLRA has “the same meanings as in the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80b–1 et seq.],”89 
which is: 
“Underwriter” means any person who has purchased from an issuer 
with a view to, or sells for an issuer in connection with, the 
distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect 
participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a 
participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such 
undertaking; but such term shall not include a person whose interest 
is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in 
excess of the usual and customary distributor’s or seller’s 
commission.90 
In those cases where the analyst’s own firm is engaged 
in the underwriting of the security covered by the analyst’s 
reports, such analysts could be deemed (depending on the facts) 
to have participated in the underwriting. Indeed, a key 
contention in many of the Rule 10b-5 actions against analysts 
is that analysts have had indirect (if not direct) participation in 
their firm’s banking activity via their role in touting the 
  
 86 See supra note 83; see also infra Part II.A.2.b (discussing “meaningful 
cautionary statements” within the context of the bespeaks caution doctrine). 
 87 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a) (2000). 
 88 See HAFT & HUDSON, supra note 85, at 552 n.164 (opining that the safe 
harbor “would only apply, if at all, to an investment bank that underwrote securities of 
the issuer. It would not apply directly to analysts.”). 
 89 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(20). 
 90 Id. § 80b-2(a)(20). 
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underwritten securities in their research reports.91 Moreover, 
regardless of his or her actual role in the underwriting effort, 
the mere fact that the analyst is an employee of the 
underwriting firm could arguably transform him or her into an 
“underwriter” for purposes of the PSLRA under agency 
principles.92  
In the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of 
Conference which recommended passage of the PSLRA, the 
“muzzling effect of abusive securities litigation” was discussed 
prominently.93 The Committee explained that it “adopted a 
statutory ‘safe harbor’ to enhance market efficiency by 
encouraging companies to disclose forward-looking 
information.”94 The Committee’s comments on the provision’s 
applicability to underwriters does not, however, shed much 
light on whether an analyst would be covered.95 Thus, even if 
Rule 10b-5 liability were found applicable to a research analyst 
accused of including misleading opinions in his or her report, 
whether such analyst could avail himself or herself of the 
PSLRA’s safe harbor by revealing his or her conflicts of interest 
is itself an open question. 
b. “Bespeaks Caution” Doctrine 
In promulgating the PSLRA’s statutory safe harbor, the 
Conference Committee explicitly noted that it did not intend 
for the safe harbor “to replace the judicial ‘bespeaks caution’ 
doctrine or to foreclose further development of that doctrine by 
the courts.”96 The bespeaks caution doctrine has been applied to 
analyst statements in securities litigation brought against 
  
 91 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1047; cf. Olson et al., supra note 85, at 
371.  
 92 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. C (2006). 
 93 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, in SAILING IN 
“SAFE HARBORS”: DRAFTING FORWARD-LOOKING DISCLOSURES, at 39, 52-53 (P.L.I. 
Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1020, 1997) [hereinafter 
Joint Statement]. 
 94 Id. at 53. 
 95 See id. at 55 (“The safe harbor covers underwriters, but only insofar as the 
underwriters provide forward looking information that is based on or ‘derived from’ 
information provided by the issuer. Because underwriters have what is effectively an 
adversarial relationship with issuers in performing due diligence, the use of the term 
‘derived from’ affords underwriters some latitude so that they may disclose adverse 
information that this issuer did not necessarily ‘provide.’”). 
 96 Id. at 56. 
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research analysts97 and may approximate the “Joe Isuzu” 
defense contemplated earlier, regardless of the availability of 
the statutory safe harbor.98 
The judicially created bespeaks caution doctrine 
essentially reduces otherwise-material statements to 
immaterial under certain circumstances.99 Under the doctrine, 
“forecasts, opinions, or projections do not amount to ‘material 
misrepresentations’ if ‘meaningful cautionary statements’ 
accompany the forward-looking statements.”100 As with the 
PSLRA’s safe harbor, the definition of “meaningful” is not 
entirely clear, but will depend on the circumstances. Again, 
Virginia Bankshares might be instructive here, as in that case 
the Supreme Court addressed the closely related issue of 
materiality within the context of a proxy statement containing 
both accurate data and misleading statements: 
[P]etitioners are on perfectly firm ground insofar as they argue that 
publishing accurate facts in a proxy statement can render a 
misleading proposition too unimportant to ground liability.  
But not every mixture with the true will neutralize the deceptive. If 
it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one 
and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and 
liability should follow.101 
In the case of those analysts who have fully disclosed 
their conflict(s) of interest, it becomes difficult to see how such 
analysts’ opinions could ever have a substantial likelihood of 
being considered important to the investment decision of a 
reasonable investor. For would not a reasonable investor, 
informed of an analyst’s conflicts, appropriately discount the 
importance of that analyst’s opinion as subject to potential 
bias? Thus, full disclosure of an analyst’s conflict(s) of interest 
could be deemed to put investors on notice that, at a minimum, 
the opinions and recommendations contained in the analyst’s 
report are subject to bias and are not to be relied upon as an 
“important” factor in a reasonable investor’s research decisions, 
  
 97 See In re Salomon Analyst AT&T Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 455, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
 98 See supra text accompanying note 83. 
 99 See Roddy, supra note 45, at 218. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991). 
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thereby defeating any argument that such opinions are 
material.102  
Taken to its logical conclusion, then, the bespeaks 
caution doctrine would appear to insulate analysts from 
liability for false opinions, so long as the reader of the analyst’s 
reports has sufficient disclosure of the analyst’s conflicts along 
with complete and accurate information regarding the company 
as outlined above—in other words, disclosure that would 
enable the investor to (1) grasp the incongruity between the 
analyst’s recommendations or opinions and the condition 
and/or prospects of the covered company, and (2) discount the 
analyst’s opinions on account of clear grounds for bias.103 As 
Professor Palmiter has explained: 
Federal courts in securities fraud cases have declared that 
disclosures must be read in their context and if forecasts, opinions, 
or projections are accompanied by sufficiently clear warnings so that 
no reasonable investor would rely on them, they are not 
actionable.104 
Since the bespeaks caution doctrine, unlike the PSLRA’s 
safe harbor, is not limited to issuers and underwriters,105 
research analysts should not have much difficulty invoking its 
potential applicability to their statements. However, some have 
argued that “all the cautionary language in the world does not 
remove the taint of fraud from statements of opinion that are 
actually false.”106 To that end, there does not appear to be any 
decision in which a court applied the bespeaks caution doctrine 
to protect a defendant who was accused of making a knowingly 
false statement. Thus, as with the safe harbor provision of the 
PSLRA, the bespeaks caution defense is ultimately of 
questionable utility to a research analyst who includes 
  
 102 This understanding of the expected effect that knowledge of analyst 
conflicts can be expected to have on investors presents, in turn, a strong argument in 
favor of finding the omission in a research report of such conflicts to be itself material. 
And it certainly is fair to say that regulators apparently find such omissions important 
(and, as can be safely assumed, material as well), as evidenced by their aggressive 
prosecution of those research analysts whose firms entered into the aforementioned 
Global Settlement. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34. 
 103 Cf. Weiss, supra note 44, at 454-55 (observing that sufficient warnings and 
disclaimers “may insulate the analyst from liability”); Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 
1097 (“publishing accurate facts in a proxy statement can render a misleading 
proposition too unimportant to ground liability.”). 
 104 Palmiter, supra note 78, at 71 (addressing the bespeaks caution doctrine). 
 105 See supra note 87 and accompanying text; id. at 71-73. 
 106 In re Salomon Analyst AT&T Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 455, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
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dishonest statements of opinion in a report, even if the report  
is otherwise complete and accurate, and contains sufficient 
disclosure of the analyst’s conflicts.  
3. Scienter 
Scienter for Rule 10b-5 purposes encompasses an 
“intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,” or recklessness to 
that same end.107 Intentionally misportrayed opinions on the 
part of analysts satisfy the element of scienter by definition. 
Scienter would most likely be difficult to prove within the 
context of an omission concerning conflicts of interest, 
especially in the absence of any accompanying false or 
misleading statements.108 For, in the absence of a skewed 
research report that contained false or misleading statements, 
the omission of a statement regarding the analyst’s conflicts of 
interest would appear to be unintentional rather than 
purposeful. However, it could be argued, perhaps, that even a 
completely honest analyst has an incentive to keep secret any 
conflicts of interest in order to bolster the credibility of his or 
her reports, and the factual record could potentially bear that 
argument out. In any event, difficulty in demonstrating the 
existence of scienter goes to questions of proof, and not 
whether, theoretically, this particular element could ever be 
satisfied. Thus, the element of scienter does not pose a 
theoretical challenge to the applicability of Rule 10b-5 liability 
to analysts whose reports include misstatements and/or 
omissions.  
4. In Connection with the Purchase or Sale of Securities 
The courts have interpreted the element of “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security” quite 
broadly, encompassing practically everything that played a role 
in a reasonable investor’s decision to purchase or sell a 
security.109 Thus: 
  
 107 See Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Response to Professor John Coffee: Analyst 
Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1305, 1317 (2004) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976)). 
 108 See Gross, supra note 32, at 664. 
 109 See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(en banc); see also Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 
6, 12 (1971). 
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In cases involving the public dissemination of false and misleading 
information, courts have held that “where the fraud alleged involves 
the public dissemination of information in a medium upon which an 
investor would presumably rely, the ‘in connection with’ element 
may be established by proof of the materiality of the 
misrepresentation and the means of its dissemination.”110 
In light of the standard applied, this element of Rule 
10b-5 liability would readily be satisfied in the case of a 
securities analyst whose reports included material omissions or 
misstatements, and, as with scienter, does not present a 
theoretical ambiguity with regard to the Rule’s applicability.111 
5. Reliance 
A Rule 10b-5 plaintiff must prove that “defendant’s 
misrepresentation or omission caused him to purchase the 
recommended security.”112 This element is known as reliance, 
sometimes referred to as “transaction causation.”113 Within the 
context of an omission, the Supreme Court has essentially 
dispensed with the reliance requirement, holding that so long 
as the omission was material, a presumption of reliance will be 
made.114 Within the context of an affirmative misstatement, 
reliance can be demonstrated by evidence showing that the 
analyst’s report played a role in plaintiff’s decision to purchase 
(or sell) the security in question.115 Absent such evidence, a 
plaintiff could possibly enjoy a presumption of reliance under 
the “fraud-on-the-market” doctrine.116 “Under this doctrine, 
plaintiffs are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of direct 
reliance if they relied on the integrity of an efficient market 
where face-to-face transactions do not occur.”117 An efficient 
market, as explained previously, is one in which the price of a 
security is affected by all publicly available material 
information.118 By relying on the stock price, an investor in an 
efficient market is (the argument goes) relying, in part, on 
  
 110 See Nowicki, supra note 107, at 1345 (citing Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 
223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
 111 See id. 
 112 See Gross, supra note 32, at 671. 
 113 See id. 
 114 See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 
(1972). 
 115 See Gross, supra note 32, at 671. 
 116 See id. at 672. 
 117 See id. 
 118 See supra Part I.A. 
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analyst reports, even if he or she never read them, because the 
information contained in such reports would have been 
assimilated into the stock price.119 And, as one commentator 
has concluded, “[s]ince virtually all securities covered by a 
research analyst are traded in an efficient market, a plaintiff 
could sue an analyst without the need to prove reliance.”120  
Others, however, have questioned the availability of the 
fraud-on-the-market doctrine to analyst statements.121 As 
Judge Rakoff of the Southern District of New York explained:  
[T]here is a qualitative difference between a statement of fact 
emanating from an issuer and a statement of opinion emanating 
from a research analyst. A well-developed efficient market can 
reasonably be presumed to translate the former into an effect on 
price, whereas no such presumption attaches to the latter. This, in 
turn, is because statements of facts emanating from an issuer are 
relatively fixed, certain, and uncontradicted. Thus, if an issuer says 
its profits increased 10%, an efficient market, relying on that 
statement, fixes a price accordingly. If later it is revealed that the 
previous statement was untrue and that the profits only increased 
5%, the market reaction is once again reasonably predictable and 
ascertainable. . . .  
As a result, no automatic impact on the price of a security can be 
presumed and instead must be proven and measured before the 
statement can be said to have defrauded the market in any material 
way that is not simply speculative.122 
Thus, for the largest class of potential plaintiffs (those 
purchasers of a security who did not rely directly on the 
defendant-analyst’s research report), the question of reliance is 
  
 119 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988). 
 120 See Gross, supra note 32, at 672-73. 
 121 See, e.g., DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(questioning applicability of fraud-on-the-market theory in context of non-issuer 
statements). In 2005, the Second Circuit indicated that it would review the 
applicability of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to non-issuer statements. Pamela A. 
MacLean, Investor Suits May Face New Challenge, NAT’L L.J., July 18, 2005, at 1. But 
the court ultimately based its subsequent ruling on a finding that the IPO market 
should not be considered efficient, and not on whether non-issuer statements can serve 
as the basis of a fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance. In re Initial Public Offerings 
Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 42-43 (2d Cir. 2006). The court did opine, however, that “[i]t is 
also doubtful whether the Basic [v. Levinson] presumption can be extended, beyond its 
original context, to tie-in trading, underwriter compensation, and analysts’ reports.” Id. 
at 43 (citing West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002)).   
 122 DeMarco, 222 F.R.D. at 246-47. But see id. at 246 (acknowledging that 
there is evidence to suggest that “some research analysts may have the ability to 
influence market prices on the basis of their recommendations”); SEC, Securities 
Analyst Recommendations, http://www.sec.gov/answers/analyst.htm (last visited Sept. 
10, 2007) (noting that “[a]nalyst recommendations can significantly move a company’s 
stock price”). 
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unsettled. But for investors who could prove that they did in 
fact rely directly on an analyst’s reports, the reliance element 
would clearly be met. 
6. Loss Causation 
Loss causation, for purposes of Rule 10b-5, is a “causal 
link between the alleged misconduct and the economic harm 
ultimately suffered by the plaintiff.”123 Ordinarily, loss 
causation is calculated by examining the reaction of stock price 
to the announcement or news rectifying the actionable 
misstatement or omission in question.124 However, in most 
analyst-conflict cases, the conflicts of interest and/or the 
disingenuousness of opinions are discovered well after a 
security’s price drops for other reasons.125 This makes it 
exceedingly difficult for Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs to demonstrate 
loss causation within the context of analyst misconduct.126 
Notwithstanding this difficulty, however, the element of loss 
causation poses only a factual/pleading problem and does not 
present a conceptual obstacle as applied to research analyst 
misconduct. 
7. Duty 
Most courts and commentators have presumed that a 
duty to disclose must exist before an investor can recover 
damages under § 10(b) premised upon the omission of a 
material fact.127 This presumption is based on the general 
understanding that one ordinarily does not have a duty to 
speak, and thus a lawsuit alleging fraudulent silence requires 
the presence of some pre-existing duty.128 The basis of such a 
duty within the context of analyst omissions is unclear.129 
  
 123 Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 
197 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 124 See Moses, supra note 18, at 108. 
 125 See id. at 108-09. 
 126 See id. at 109-10; Dura Pharm. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005). 
 127 E.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 
549, 574 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
 128 See John J. Clark, Jr. & William F. Alderman, Potential Liabilities in 
Initial Public Offerings, at 319, 347 (P.L.I. Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook 
Series No. 1518, 2005) (“A defendant cannot be held liable for a failure to disclose 
information allegedly withheld from the market unless the defendant was under a duty 
to disclose the information at the time.”); see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222, 234-35 (1980) (“Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it 
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Other commentators, however, have pointed out that 
the text of §10(b) does not require liability for an omission to be 
conditioned upon a duty.130 As Professor Elizabeth Nowicki has 
explained: 
A close look at Section 10(b) . . . makes clear that Congress never 
spoke of duty when crafting Section 10(b). There is no “duty” 
prerequisite to the applicability of Section 10(b), nor is “duty” an 
element of a successful Section 10(b) claim. . . . When Congress 
drafted Section 10(b), Congress did not speak to the characteristics 
of the target of Section 10(b)’s application. . . . All that matters is 
that the . . . elements of a Section 10(b) claim are satisfied, 
regardless of who is the defendant satisfying the elements.131 
Regardless of whether such a duty exists, however, it is 
fairly well established that once a party elects to make a 
statement, Rule 10b-5 requires that such statement not omit 
whatever material facts are necessary in order to make the 
statement not misleading.132 Therefore, once an analyst decides 
to communicate to investors (and potential investors) via a 
research report, that report must not omit anything that would 
cause its content to be misleading.133 
B. Analyst-Specific Regulatory Requirements 
Prompted, in part, by the limitations of, and difficulties 
of recourse to, Rule 10b-5 to address the problem of analyst 
conflicts, the SEC and NASD have enacted regulations to 
govern the conduct of research analysts: SEC Regulation AC 
and NASD Rule 2711. As shall be seen, SEC Regulation AC 
closes whatever loopholes might exist that would permit a 
  
catches must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there 
can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.”). 
 129 See Sullivan, supra note 16, at 428 (“The extent of an analyst’s duty to 
disclose conflicts of interest to potential investors is unclear.”). It should be noted that 
when the investor in question is a client of the analyst’s firm, the duty would appear to 
exist. See id. As Professor Gross has explained, broker-dealers, including sell-side 
analysts employed by them, “have a duty to deal fairly with their customers. This duty 
of fair dealing encompasses the duty to give customers their undivided loyalty.” See 
Gross, supra note 32, at 636. 
 130 See Nowicki, supra note 107, at 1314. 
 131 See id. at 1314, 1324. But see Sieland, supra note 15, at 550 (“[B]ecause 
section 10(b) alleges fraud, there must be a duty extending from the defendant to the 
plaintiff.”). 
 132 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.19 (5th 
ed. 2005). 
 133 Id. As explained previously, whether an analyst’s failure to disclose a 
conflict of interest constitutes an actionable omission under Rule 10b-5 is not entirely 
certain. See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.  
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research analyst to evade potential liability for issuing false 
opinions and recommendations (by, for example, attempting to 
rely on either the PSLRA’s safe harbor or the bespeaks caution 
doctrine), and NASD Rule 2711 requires (of NASD members) 
that companies adopt policies and procedures to address those 
factors that give rise to an analyst’s conflicts of interest. 
1. Regulation AC 
SEC Regulation AC (“Analyst Certification”) requires 
“all brokers, dealers, and certain other persons associated with 
brokers and dealers to add certifications to their research 
reports stating that the research analyst believes that the 
report accurately reflects his or her personal views and 
disclosing any compensation or other payments received in 
connection with the recommendations or views.”134 Regulation 
AC, therefore, addresses the dishonesty issue squarely, and 
positively precludes a research analyst (via the certification 
requirement) from setting forth an opinion or recommendation 
that runs counter to his or her true beliefs—regardless of the 
accuracy or completeness of the factual information contained 
in the report, and regardless of any disclosure of the analyst’s 
conflict(s) of interests. In light of Regulation AC, a research 
analyst could not issue a fraudulent opinion and successfully 
hide behind the fig leaf of full disclosure in an attempt to evade 
sanction. 
2. Rule 2711 
Implemented in 2002 by the NASD, following SEC 
approval, Rule 2711 mandates that NASD members implement 
certain structural safeguards to diminish a research analyst’s 
potential conflicts of interest.135 These safeguards include 
prohibitions on promises of favorable research coverage by 
investment banks to their clients (or potential clients), 
prohibitions on submission of research reports to covered 
company’s before publication, and prohibitions on investment 
banking “supervision or control” over research analysts.136 Also 
prohibited is basing analyst compensation on “any relationship 
between the analyst’s research reports and investment banking 
  
 134 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1069. 
 135 See Hurt, supra note 29, at 779-81. 
 136 See id. at 780-81. 
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clients.”137 Additionally, Rule 2711 requires an analyst to 
disclose certain conflicts of interest in his or her research 
reports, but it does not require the analyst to affirmatively 
vouch for the authenticity of his or her opinions and/or 
recommendations, as does SEC Regulation AC.138 Thus, Rule 
2711 attempts to minimize the fundamental conflicts of interest 
that give rise to research analyst misconduct via structural 
changes and disclosure, but stops short of demanding that an 
analyst certify the honesty and truthfulness of his or her 
published recommendations and opinions. 
C. The Need for a Normative Analysis 
Due to questions regarding, among other things, the 
actionability of opinions in general, the materiality of analyst 
opinions in particular, and the applicability of the fraud-on-the-
market presumption in place of individualized reliance, Rule 
10b-5’s ability to serve as a vehicle for imposing liability on 
analysts for misstated opinions is questionable. This 
questionability gave rise to the flurry of regulatory activity that 
brought about Regulation AC and Rule 2711—each designed to 
fill the perceived gap created by Rule 10b-5’s apparent inability 
to police analyst conflicts of interest. But this begs an 
interesting question: is Rule 10b-5’s apparent inability truly a 
shortcoming? Perhaps the failure of the traditional elements of 
Rule 10b-5 to cover the phenomenon of analyst fraud suggests 
that such fraud ought not be subject to sanction. And, if not, 
then Regulation AC and Rule 2711 could arguably cause more 
harm than good. For these and similar questions, a normative 
lens is needed through which securities law and policy can be 
analyzed. 
III. NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOLUTIONS TO RESEARCH 
ANALYST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
The inadequacy of Rule 10b-5 to address the issue of 
analyst conflicts of interest invites a discussion of other 
potential solutions to this perceived problem. It also invites a 
discussion of whether any solution should be adopted at all. 
The business of dividing wheat from chaff, of judging various 
solutions for appropriateness and efficacy, is obviously 
  
 137 See id. at 781. 
 138 See id. at 781-82; 17 C.F.R. § 242.501 (2005). 
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predicated upon some standard (or set of standards) that 
enables such judgments to be made. Economic analysis has 
been heavily relied upon by those considering questions of 
securities law, and such reliance seems most reasonable given 
the direct role of U.S. securities law in regulating an important 
part of the U.S. (and, indeed, the world’s) economy. In keeping 
with this practice, this Part shall provide an economic analysis 
of the problem of analyst conflicts (and of solutions proposed 
thereto). But in a break from the common, this Part shall also 
review the problem of analyst conflicts from another source of 
standards and norms—those of the natural law tradition. As 
indicated at the outset of this Article, this demonstration shall 
reveal that a natural law approach to the problem of analyst 
misconduct yields results and recommendations that comport 
better with the philosophy of U.S. securities regulation than 
does the law and economics approach. 
Preliminary to a comparison of economics-based and 
natural law-based approaches to the problem of analyst 
conflicts, and an assessment of how these approaches comport 
with the underlying philosophy of U.S. securities regulation, is, 
of course, an identification of this underlying philosophy. Thus, 
this Part commences with a brief review of the history of U.S. 
federal securities regulation and an identification of the values 
that undergird the regulatory approach.139  
A. Objectives and Values of U.S. Securities Laws 
On the heels of the Stock Market Crash of the 1929 and 
the Great Depression that followed, Franklin D. Roosevelt ran 
a 1932 presidential campaign that included an attack on Wall 
  
 139 The federal securities laws (as do virtually all substantive laws) both 
reflect and effectuate certain values or norms. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
203-04 (2d ed. 1994) (“The law of every modern state shows at a thousand points the 
influence of both the accepted social morality and wider moral ideals.”); see also 
CHARLES E. RICE, 50 QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW 95 (1999). Thus, when 
ambiguities in the law must be resolved, or when decisions must be made regarding 
the appropriate scope or application of the law, it is inevitable, fitting, and proper to 
consult a broader source of norms to supplement, to the extent necessary, the moral 
framework of the particular law in question. Cf. id. at 95 (observing that “all human 
law enforces morality of some sort . . . . The question is therefore not whether the 
human law should enforce morality but rather which morality it will, and should, 
enforce.”); Jack Balkin, The Proliferation of Legal Truth, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 
8 (2003) (“[L]aw does shape what people believe and what they understand. Law has 
power over people’s imaginations and how they think about what is happening in social 
life. Law in this sense is more than a set of sanctions. It is a form of cultural software 
that shapes the way we think about and apprehend the world.”). 
120 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1 
Street’s “unscrupulous money changers” who knew “only the 
rules of a generation of self-seekers.”140 He pledged to “restore 
[the] temple to the ancient truths,” including “honesty,” 
“honor,” “the sacredness of obligations,” “faithful protection,” 
and “unselfish performance.”141 Only upon such a restoration, 
Roosevelt argued, could investor confidence, and thus the 
capital markets, be resuscitated.142  
Shortly after his inauguration, President Roosevelt 
went to work on the “moral reform of Wall Street,” and early 
SEC officials sought to restore “traditional standards of right 
and wrong.”143 In Congress he had a willing partner and, in 
short time, the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act were passed.144 In passing this legislation, 
Congress, as one commentator has remarked, “was attempting 
to improve the morality of the marketplace.”145 And as John H. 
Walsh (former Chief Counsel in the SEC’s Office of Compliance 
Inspections and Examination) explains, the moral vision that 
inspired the Securities Acts were not lost upon those initially 
chosen to oversee the newly implemented regulatory regime: 
• Baldwin B. Bane, Chief of the Securities Division of 
the Federal Trade Commission (the agency initially 
responsible for administering the Securities Act), 
stated that the recently passed securities legislation 
was “based on a ‘moral ideal.’ It was the ‘realization 
that [the economy’s] ills [were] due . . . to the 
weakening of [the nation’s] moral fibre, [and] to easy 
temporizing with traditional and tried standards of 
right and wrong.’”146 
• Joseph P. Kennedy, the first Chairman of the SEC, 
said that the SEC’s most important objective was 
  
 140 John H. Walsh, A Simple Code of Ethics: A History of the Moral Purpose 
Inspiring Federal Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015, 1036 
(2001). 
 141 Id. 
 142 See id. 
 143 Id. at 1037-42, 1070. 
 144 Id. at 1042-52. 
 145 David Ferber, The Case Against Insider Trading: A Response to Professor 
Manne, 23 VAND. L. REV. 621, 622 (1970). 
 146 See Walsh, supra note 140, at 1054 (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted). 
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“spiritual,” and that it sought “to prevent vice” in the 
securities industry.147 
• John Burns, the first General Counsel of the SEC, 
proclaimed that the “failure of morals and religion to 
put a bridle to the acquisitive motive[s] of . . . 
business . . . made the intervention of the law 
inevitable.”148 
A moral prescription for economic ills was not seen as 
inapposite given the understanding that a more ethical 
securities industry would improve investor confidence and, in 
turn, improve the capital markets.149 As the drafters of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act explained: 
[i]f investor confidence is to come back to the benefit of exchanges 
and corporations alike, the law must advance. . . . [I]t becomes a 
condition of the very stability of that society that its rules of law and 
of business practice recognize and protect . . . ordinary citizen’s 
dependent position. Unless constant extension of the legal 
conception of a fiduciary relationship—a guarantee of “straight 
shooting”—supports the constant extension of mutual confidence 
which is the foundation of a maturing and complicated economic 
system, easy liquidity of the resources in which wealth is invested is 
a danger rather than a prop to the stability of that system. When 
everything everyone owns can be sold at once, there must be 
confidence not to sell. Just in proportion as it becomes more liquid 
and complicated, an economic system must become more moderate, 
more honest, and more justifiably self-trusting.150 
From this statement can be gleaned the interrelated 
concerns and insights of the architects of the U.S. securities 
regulatory regime. Investor protection and the health of the 
capital markets were objectives of paramount concern; 
necessary to the ascertainment of these objectives was the 
restoration of certain virtues to the U.S. economic system—
namely, moderation, honesty, and trustworthiness.151 More 
recently, the Second Circuit has opined that Congress passed 
  
 147 Id. at 1053. 
 148 Id. at 1052-53. 
 149 See id. at 1036. 
 150 Nowicki, supra note 107, at 1312 (quoting Report to Accompany S. 3420, 
Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 72d Cong., S. Rep. No. 792 (Apr. 17, 1934)) 
(alterations in original). 
 151 See id. As recently as 1997 Congress echoed the fundamental purposes of 
U.S. securities regulation: “to protect investors and to maintain confidence in the 
securities markets, so that our national savings, capital formation and investment may 
grow for the benefit of all Americans.” Joint Statement, supra note 93, at 41.  
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the 1934 Securities Exchange Act “to prevent inequitable and 
unfair practices and to insure fairness in securities 
transactions generally, whether conducted face-to-face, over 
the counter, or on exchanges”152—thereby summarizing a 
primary purpose of the securities laws as the achievement of 
“fairness.” 153 
Pursuant to the wisdom that “[s]unlight is said to be the 
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
policeman,”154 Congress opted, primarily, for a regime of 
mandatory disclosure to achieve its legislative ends.155 As one 
commentator has explained: 
When promulgating the federal securities acts, Congress examined 
different theories of securities regulation, and ultimately chose a 
licensing scheme that embraced a fundamental purpose . . . to 
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat 
emptor and thus achieve a high standard of business ethics in the 
securities industry.156 
Full disclosure, however, for all its fundamentality to 
the U.S. approach to securities regulation is, of course, not the 
sole mechanism relied upon by Congress to protect investors. 
At the forefront of enactments supplementing the disclosure 
regime are Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act 
and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.157 These 
antifraud provisions go beyond disclosure alone and directly 
ban the issuance of false statements and deceptive omissions in 
securities trading—regardless of whether these statements and 
omissions concern mandatorily disclosed information.158 Thus, 
  
 152 SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 153 Id. 
 154 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, AND HOW THE BANKERS USE 
IT 92 (1914). 
 155 See Leonard J. DePasquale, Helping to Ameliorate the Doctrine of Caveat 
Emptor in the Securities Market: Reves v. Ernst & Young, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 893, 
896 (1992). 
 156 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original). 
 157 See supra Part II.A. 
 158 It could be asserted that the prevailing modern approach to securities 
regulation cares less about truthfulness per se in light of the advent of the bespeaks 
caution doctrine and the PSLRA’s safe harbor (especially within the context of “soft” 
information such as opinions and forecasts). However, one must be careful not to read 
too much into the safe harbor and bespeaks caution doctrine. Although they may 
technically grant a “license to lie,” see Brooks & Wang, supra note 85, at 4, they more 
properly are read as efforts at encouraging the dissemination of non-required 
disclosure by creating a zone of safety to protect against litigation and liability. Akin to 
“good Samaritan laws,” the purpose of which is not to protect those who would literally 
kick a victim while he or she was down, but rather to free would-be rescuers from the 
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although eschewing an approach of requiring minimum 
solvency standards for companies whose securities are 
purchased and sold (which characterized the approach taken by 
state securities laws at the time), Congress did require that 
investors be provided with certain key pieces of information, 
and that all the information furnished to investors (whether 
required or not) in connection with the purchase or sale of 
security be complete and accurate.159   
Applying the objectives, values, and philosophy of the 
securities laws to the question of research analyst conflicts 
certainly confirms that the issue is correctly identified as a 
problem to be addressed. Investors have been hurt, confidence 
in the market has been compromised, and whether long-term 
harm to economic growth shall result from this remains to be 
seen. As for the most appropriate response to this problem, we 
shall now turn to the analytic tools of the economics and 
natural law reasoning. 
B. Law and Economics Analysis 
1. Law and Economics Generally 
One of the most powerful approaches in the analysis of 
law in recent decades is that offered by economics, commonly 
referred to as “law and economics” or an “economic analysis of 
the law.” Few such approaches have had such impact on legal 
scholarship and thought, and few subjects are more 
  
risk of liability, the safe harbor and bespeaks caution doctrine aim at removing the 
liability-risk disincentive against those who, in good faith, would like to go beyond the 
bare minimum disclosure requirements of the securities laws but are fearful of doing 
so. Understanding this context helps disabuse one of any notion that Congress and the 
courts have moved away from a model of investor protection based on the coupling of 
disclosure with an antifraud rule; rather, Congress and the courts are merely seeking 
to promote the release of supplemental, “soft information” by making it more difficult 
to hold good faith suppliers of such information liable merely for estimating or 
forecasting incorrectly. Indeed, Congress’s expressed purpose in passing the PSLRA’s 
safe harbor was, in part, to “enhance market efficiency.” Joint Statement, supra note 
93, at 52. As the promulgation of false or misleading information does not enhance 
market efficiency (and may, in fact, harm market efficiency, see Fisch & Sale, supra 
note 10, at 1086), the arguable protection of authors of such information from liability 
should be interpreted as a necessary evil at best, and not as a statement of change in 
philosophy or policy. 
 159 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of 
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 26-27. 
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appropriately analyzed under the lens of economics than the 
securities laws.160 
The economic approach to the law embraces, as given, 
the fundamental premises of the free market economy: that 
individuals are rational beings who predictably pursue their 
self-interest and, in doing so, generally serve to maximize 
society’s creation of wealth.161 The objective of law, therefore 
(under a law and economics approach), is to establish rules that 
assist society to so function (largely by addressing market 
failures and minimizing transaction costs) in order to maximize 
societal wealth (often referred to as promoting “efficiency”).162 
This line of reasoning has led some scholars to argue that 
“properly understood, securities regulation is not a consumer 
protection law,” but rather a regime concerned with 
“facilitate[ing] a competitive market for information traders.”163 
Thus, applied to the research analyst conflicts-of-
interest issue, the law and economics approach frankly 
suggests disregarding the promotion of virtue, the extirpation 
of vice, even “investor protection” as goals per se, and instead 
aims simply at increasing market efficiency by reducing 
transaction costs and correcting for market failures.164 
2. Law and Economics Applied 
In order to facilitate a law and economics review of the 
research analyst conflict-of-interest problem, solutions (both 
potential and applied) to the problem have been sorted into 
  
 160 Cf. David B. Sentelle, Law and Economics Should Be Used for Economic 
Questions, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 121, 121 (1997) (arguing that the judiciary’s use 
of economic analysis should be limited to questions properly pertaining to economics). 
 161 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10-
11 (3d ed. 2003); J.M. ROBERTS, THE PELICAN HISTORY OF THE WORLD 675 (1983). 
 162 See Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick, Functional Law and Economics: 
The Search for Value-Neutral Principles of Lawmaking, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 431, 444-
45 (2004); Annalise E. Acorn, Valuing Virtue: Morality and Productivity in Posner’s 
Theory of Wealth Maximization, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 167, 171 (1993); POLINSKY, supra 
note 161, at 7. 
 163 Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities 
Regulation 1 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n 15th Annual Meeting Working Paper No. 9, 
2005), available at http://law.bepress.com/alea/15th/art9. Lending anecdotal support to 
this position (within the context of research reports, at least), is the proclamation of at 
least one prominent analyst that her audience is not the individual investor, but rather 
“professional money managers” and institutions. See Sieland, supra note 15, at 545.  
 164 See POLINSKY, supra note 161, at 7. A dichotomy exists between positive 
(purely descriptive) and normative (prescriptive) approaches. See id. at xvii. As may 
have already been discerned, the approach taken (and critiqued) in this Article shall be 
normative (prescriptive).  
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four general categories: (1) a laissez-faire approach, (2) an 
antifraud rule, (3) mandatory disclosure, and (4) a structural 
approach. The merit of each of these categories shall be 
assessed, in turn, from a law and economics perspective.  
a. Laissez-Faire Approach 
Under a laissez faire approach to the problem of analyst 
misconduct, no legal rule would be adopted to address the 
conflict of interest problem. Instead, the market would be 
expected to most efficiently address this issue.165 
As there are costs associated with the disclosure of 
information, any fixed rule regarding disclosure is bound to 
require either too little or too great an amount of disclosure.166 
This is because rules are bound to be imperfect, if for no other 
reason than the fact that rules are fairly static and the 
demands of the market are dynamic.167 Sub-optimal levels of 
disclosure extract an unnecessary cost on disclosing parties 
and, consequently, on the market as a whole. Assuming a 
properly functioning, competitive market, the optimal level of 
disclosure, just as the optimal price of a good or service, should 
be set by the market through competition.168 
Much literature has been generated over the issue of the 
optimal level of corporate disclosure under the securities 
laws.169 The focus of this literature, however, has almost 
invariably been disclosure on the part of issuers of securities 
for the purpose of attracting investment (either primarily, 
through disclosure sufficient to support an offering, or 
secondarily, through disclosure sufficient to maintain a healthy 
secondary market for the issuer’s securities).170 The need to 
attract investment (and maintain a healthy secondary market) 
creates competition among corporate issuers for investors.171 
This competition encourages issuers to disclose the optimal 
  
 165 Cf. Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci, Tort Law and Economics, in ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 6 (forthcoming). 
 166 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 
68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1034 (2000). 
 167 Cf. David Van Drunen, Aquinas and Hayek on the Limits of Law: A 
Convergence of Ethical Traditions, J. MARKETS & MORALITY, Fall 2002, at 315, 327 
(observing the inability “to legislate a system of law that cleanly resolves all future 
matters of conflict” ). 
 168 See id. 
 169 See, e.g., id.; see also Palmiter, supra note 78. 
 170 E.g., Palmiter, supra note 78. 
 171 See id. 
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level of information necessary to investors—that is, just enough 
information to attract the required amount of investment.172 
The provision of less information would cause investors to 
eschew the putative issuer in favor of competing issuers’ 
securities; the provision of more information would be 
unnecessary and therefore wasteful at best.173 As for the quality 
of the information provided (in terms of accuracy and honesty), 
the market would punish an issuer who disclosed false or 
misleading information by devaluing the price of its future 
offerings on account of a lack of trust. Thus, there is an 
economic incentive for issuers to make disclosures that are 
accurate as well as sufficient. 
With regard to research analyst reporting, a threshold 
question from a law and economics perspective is whether 
circumstances exist so as to justify departing from the 
conclusion that market forces should result in an optimal state 
of affairs. Put differently, one must consider whether research 
reporting takes place within a properly functioning, 
competitive market—an assumption that forms the basis for 
the law and economics conclusion that market forces alone 
should maximize societal wealth. The existence of serious 
conflicts of interest challenges these assumptions.174 
As explained previously, sell-side analyst reports are 
usually provided free of charge to a bank’s customers.175 Thus, 
such reports are part of the total mix of goods and services that 
banks use to attract and maintain investor clients. The greater 
the value that the market for investors assigns to these 
reports, the more effective these reports will be in attracting 
and maintaining investor clients and, consequently, all things 
being equal, the more competitive their issuing bank will be.  
However, as has also been previously discussed, analyst 
reports serve (or traditionally have served) at least one 
additional purpose: the promotion of the securities offerings of 
a bank’s investment-banking clients in order to attract and 
maintain such clients.176 Again, the investment-banking market 
will assign a value to these reports relative to their worth to 
investment banking clients, and the higher the value, all 
  
 172 See id. 
 173 See id. 
 174 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case 
for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984). 
 175 See supra text accompanying note 13. 
 176 See supra Part I.B. 
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things being equal, the more competitive the investment-
banking franchise of the bank issuing the research reports will 
be. 
Conventional wisdom posits that the cross-purposes 
served by research reports give rise to a classic conflict of 
interest.177 However, scrutiny reveals that the dual purposes of 
the research reports arguably work in tandem to compel 
optimal levels of disclosure and accuracy. For what 
distinguishes a research report from mere marketing material 
is its aura of objectivity and the quality of data contained 
therein (especially the underlying factual data). The only 
divergence created by the different purposes of research 
reporting is that whereas investor clients want objective, 
honest research reports, investment-banking clients care more 
about the perception of objective, honest research reports 
(coupled with their more pressing desire for positive research 
coverage). Since, presumably, the best way of developing and 
maintaining such a perception is to actually publish objective, 
honest research reports, banks have an incentive to act 
accordingly for the benefit of each identified category of clients. 
To the extent that an analyst is caught behaving dishonestly, 
his or her personal integrity would be tarnished, along with 
(possibly) the integrity of the bank for which he or she works. 
The result would be a decline in the market value of the bank’s 
research reports to both investor and investment-banking 
clients. In short, as “[r]eputation remains the lifeblood for [the 
financial industry] firm, often overwhelming other 
incentives,”178 it appears as though the market should 
sufficiently check egregious analyst misbehavior. 
And to the extent that analysts spin or skew their 
reports in order to satisfy their banking clients, it could be 
argued that the cost of this dishonesty is more than offset by 
the tremendous market benefits provided by the voluminous 
accurate financial and statistical data that research analysts 
unearth and include in their reports.179 Moreover, research 
suggests that market participants are largely aware of this 
lack of complete candor on the part of sell-side research 
analysts, as reports issued by bank-affiliated analysts are 
valued less by individual investors than reports issued by 
  
 177  See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1047. 
 178 See Palmiter, supra note 78, at 112. 
 179 Perhaps such spin or skew could be analogized to the commercials that one 
must endure in order to enjoy the desired content contained in free radio broadcasts. 
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independent research firms.180 This is despite the fact that, as 
research also suggests, analyst reports issued by banking-
affiliated analysts are of higher quality than reports issued by 
independent research firms.181 Additionally, through the use of 
brokers, investors should be able to avoid investing on the basis 
of unsupportable recommendations and instead invest upon 
quality factual data. Thus, it could be argued that the conflicts 
of interest commonly alleged are largely illusory and, in any 
event, result in negligible harm to the market. 
However, notwithstanding the market incentives in 
favor of honest research reporting, and notwithstanding the 
ability of investors (and brokers) to discount for the possibility 
of bias, the fact remains that certain analysts have published 
persuasively dishonest research reports, and apparently 
certain individual investors, perhaps unaware of the conflicts 
of interest on the part of the researcher whose report they are 
reading, claim to have placed unwarranted (in retrospect) 
levels of reliance on these reports. Additionally, some scholars 
have argued that false opinions and recommendations are not 
properly discounted by the market, but rather do harm to the 
accuracy of stock pricing (and therefore undermine market 
efficiency).182 
But simply with regard to the issue of misled investors: 
can such investors be sacrificed even if this redounds to the 
greater good of the securities market as a whole (that is, even if 
the optimal level of disclosure and honesty can be established 
by the market)? Perhaps here the potential advice of the 
economist and the mandates of the securities laws most clearly 
diverge. For it was Congress’s explicit desire to displace the 
“laissez-faire” model that predated the 1933/1934 Securities 
Acts with one that mandated fixed disclosure and required 
certain minimum levels of investor protection.183 A laissez-faire 
approach, therefore, fails to honor either concern. Thus, even if 
such an approach may indeed maximize wealth (itself a goal of 
the securities laws), it does so at the expense of other, more 
pressing goals (primarily, investor protection), and is in 
contravention of the fundamental values (such as honesty and 
fairness) inherent in the securities laws. 
  
 180 See Moses, supra note 18, at 90-91. 
 181 See Jacob et al., supra note 11, at 32. 
 182 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1086. 
 183 See supra text accompanying note 156. 
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b. Antifraud Rule Approach 
One alternative to a laissez-faire approach would be the 
imposition of an antifraud rule applicable to fraudulently 
issued analyst opinions.184 Whether via the imposition of civil, 
regulatory, or criminal liability, the rule would simply punish 
(in one way or another) a research analyst who sets forth 
opinions and/or recommendations that he or she does not 
actually believe. Because of their functional equivalency, 
certification requirements, such as Regulation AC, are included 
in this category,185 along with Professors Fisch and Sale’s 
suggestion that a “duty of reliability” for research analysts be 
recognized.186 The rule could also force research analysts to 
disclose their conflicts of interest, out of fear that neglecting to 
do so could constitute a fraudulent omission.187 
An antifraud rule could reasonably be expected to 
reduce the issuance of false opinions on the part of analysts, as, 
in economic terms, it increases the cost of issuing such opinions 
via the threat of punishment and/or liability for such 
opinions.188 But, as indicated earlier, market forces alone 
should also serve to reduce, to an extent, the issuance of false 
opinions.189 Thus, the marginal benefit of an antifraud rule, 
with regard to its role in reducing the issuance of false 
opinions, appears likely to be small.  
A more substantial benefit, perhaps, flowing from an 
antifraud rule would be the enhanced credibility (and thus 
increased value) it would arguably bestow upon analyst 
opinions. For in the presence of an antifraud rule applicable to 
analyst opinions, investors would be able to rely more heavily 
upon such opinions, thereby increasing the value of these 
opinions.190  
Weighed against the potential benefits of an antifraud 
rule applicable to analysts are its significant costs: the 
  
 184 See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 163, at 27-29. 
 185 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 186 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1081-88 (recommending liability for 
research analysts whose reports contain recommendations “that would not have been 
issued by a reasonable person”). 
 187 See supra Part II.A.1. For a discussion of the costs and benefits of 
compelling such disclosure, see infra Part III.B.2.c. 
 188 See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 163, at 27-29. 
 189 See supra Part III.B.2.a. 
 190 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and 
the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673-80 (1984) (discussing economic effect 
of antifraud rules). 
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potential chilling effect on the issuance of research reports that 
such a rule would likely have.191 Exposure to potential liability 
for fraudulent opinions (or material omissions) in research 
reports can be expected to decrease the issuance of such 
reports, by both banks responsible for the issuance of reports 
that contain exaggerated or otherwise dishonest statements of 
opinion and by banks responsible for the issuance of reports 
that are completely genuine. With regard to the latter, an 
inevitable fear will develop on the part of banks that 
statements of opinion in research reports, even if entirely 
honest and truthful, may nevertheless subject the bank to 
litigation if time were to demonstrate that the opinion was ill-
founded or mistaken. Regardless of the likely failure of such 
litigation (as we are assuming here that the opinions in 
question were genuine and published in good faith), the mere 
commencement of even an unsuccessful litigation can be 
expensive and time consuming, and this risk of litigation 
becomes a cost associated with the promulgation of research 
reports.192 Of course, this is a cost that accompanies practically 
any antifraud rule and not one unique to its application within 
this context. However, given the precarious economics of the 
research analyst business model, under which the full value of 
research reports to the marketplace arguably exceeds the 
revenues they are able to generate for their sponsoring firms, 
the additional costs imposed by an antifraud rule could tip the 
balance against their continued sponsorship to the detriment of 
the market as a whole.193 
With regard to research reports that contain 
disingenuous statements of opinion, an antifraud rule will, of 
course, deter the publication of these as well. And although 
that is instinctively viewed as a good thing, additional scrutiny 
will reveal that even this effect is not without certain potential 
negative consequences. As has been discussed previously, 
banks have traditionally issued research reports with two key 
  
 191 See Joint Statement, supra note 91, at 52-53 (expressing concern over the 
“muzzling effect of abusive securities litigation”). 
 192 See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 
683 (Senate Report accompanying passage of PSLRA addressing problem of “frivolous 
‘strike’ suits alleging violations of the Federal securities laws in the hope that 
defendants will quickly settle to avoid the expense of litigation”: “These suits, which 
unnecessarily increase the cost of raising capital and chill corporate disclosure, are 
often based on nothing more than a company’s announcement of bad news, not 
evidence of fraud.”).  
 193 Cf. Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher 
Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 274-76 (2003).  
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audiences in mind: their investor clients and their investment 
banking clients.194 Since these reports are ordinarily provided 
free of charge, the costs of their production are indirectly 
covered by the revenues they assist in generating from each of 
these client groups.195 As precluding exaggeration, hyperbole, 
and other disingenuous statements of opinion diminishes the 
value of these reports to the bank’s investment banking clients, 
banks may be less inclined to issue these reports,196 thereby 
reducing the dissemination of the otherwise valuable 
accompanying factual information regarding the covered 
company. In short, it might be better in general for the market 
to have more reports circulating (including tainted reports that 
contain an admixture of accurate factual data alongside 
disingenuous opinions and recommendations) versus a smaller 
number of completely trustworthy (or more trustworthy) 
reports.197  
These concerns suggest that, from an economics 
perspective, efforts to curb research analyst dishonesty resist 
resorting to antifraud rules.198 But the absence of an antifraud 
rule directed against dishonest analysts seems incongruous 
with the philosophy of federal securities regulation on at least 
two grounds. First, given the importance of honesty, fairness, 
and trustworthiness to the drafters of the U.S. Securities  
Acts, the absence of any rule prohibiting fraudulent misconduct 
on the part of analysts, so as to allow a modicum of dishonesty 
in research reporting, would appear to be a glaring 
inconsistency. Second, reliance on market mechanisms to 
minimize fraudulent analyst misconduct, although well- 
founded, nevertheless appears insufficient; although market 
mechanisms would most likely serve to protect most investors, 
knowledge of the fact that an antifraud rule would serve to 
further reduce fraudulent misconduct, and serve to protect all 
(or at least more) investors199 from such misconduct, makes it 
  
 194 See supra Part III.B.2.a. 
 195 See Choi & Fisch, supra note 193, at 274-76 (2003). 
 196 Unless, perhaps, their enhanced value to their investor clients, as a result 
of the antifraud rule, outweighs this diminishment in value to the investment banking 
clients. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 163, at 28-29. 
 197 But see Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1086 (arguing that analyst reports 
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 198 But see Palmiter, supra note 78, at 135. 
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difficult to square the absence of such a rule with the strong  
(if not overriding) concerns over investor protection that 
characterize the U.S. regime of securities regulation. 
c. Mandatory Disclosure 
Another approach to the problem of analyst conflicts is 
to mandate the disclosure of conflicts of interest.200 In the 
absence of an antifraud rule extending to analysts’ opinions, 
mandatory disclosure could approximate a regime in which the 
bespeaks caution doctrine and/or the safe harbor of the PSLRA 
foreclosed liability for those analysts who issued false or 
misleading opinions, but who also fully (and truthfully) 
disclosed their conflicts of interest.201 Coupled with an antifraud 
rule, mandatory disclosure is likely to have little marginal 
effect if, as expected, the antifraud rule would serve to compel 
disclosure of conflicts of interest out of a fear that 
nondisclosure of such conflicts would be actionable.202 However, 
if, as suggested, the nondisclosure of an analyst’s conflicts of 
interest might not actually be properly considered an omission 
which makes the other statements contained in the research 
report misleading,203 then a disclosure rule would close this 
loophole and clearly expose to liability those analysts who did 
not disclose their conflicts (similar to the effects of Regulation 
AC and NASD Rule 2711).204  
Although mandatory disclosure has been widely 
criticized from an economics perspective as generating 
inefficiencies,205 some have justified mandatory disclosure from 
an economics perspective as a means of reducing wasteful 
“agency costs”206 and duplicative research efforts on the part of 
  
 200 See Gross, supra note 32, at 661-62. 
 201 See supra Part IIA.2. 
 202 See supra Part III.B.2.b. 
 203 See supra text accompanying notes 73-76. 
 204 See supra Part II.B. 
 205 See supra Part III.A.1 
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in Law and Economics (U Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 
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investors.207 And unlike mandatory disclosure in the context of 
a stock issuer’s financial reporting (which is the focus of most 
economic-based criticism concerning mandatory disclosure 
rules), the cost of disclosing the existence of possible conflicts of 
interest on the part of a research analyst would be relatively 
small. A rule requiring mandatory disclosure of analyst 
conflicts would reduce the need for investors to do their own 
investigation regarding such conflicts before relying upon 
research reports.208 The greater and more specific the 
mandatory disclosure, the less work an individual investor 
would have to do (and the less agency costs he or she would 
have to bear) to uncover the same information. And because 
the disclosure contained in one report could, arguably, reduce 
agency costs for thousands of individual investors, the 
argument in favor of such mandatory disclosure is compelling: 
the costs of its inclusion in the report would appear to be 
outweighed by the benefits bestowed upon the investing 
public.209  
As previously discussed,210 a regime of mandatory 
disclosure is precisely the means selected by Congress to 
regulate the securities industry. Therefore, requiring analysts 
to disclose their conflicts of interest would be a solution that 
apparently passes muster under the philosophy of U.S. 
securities regulation and, as has been seen, can be justified 
from an economics perspective. 
d. Structural Approach 
A fourth approach suggested by some is structural: to 
attack the analyst’s conflict of interest directly by forcing 
structural changes to the securities industry that minimize the 
factors giving rise to the conflict.211 This is the approach 
embodied in NASD’s Rule 2711.212 
Obviously, the structural approach proceeds under the 
assumption that by eliminating conflicts of interest, research 
analysts will be made more independent and the quality of 
  
 207 See Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public 
Offerings, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 85, 89 (2006). 
 208 See Posner, supra note 206, at 1. 
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 210 See supra Part III.B.1. 
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opinions and recommendations contained in their research 
reports will improve. Although this assumption may be 
intuitive, at least one study suggests that analysts at 
independent research firms make earnings forecasts that are 
inferior to those of analysts associated with investment 
banks.213 This may be because bank-affiliated researchers have 
more resources at their disposal214—resources generated, in 
part, by the bank’s calibration of their research reports to 
optimize value among both their investor clients and 
investment banking clients.215 And by inefficiently decreasing 
the value that a bank can obtain for its banking clients by 
removing (or reducing) investment banking considerations 
from the production of research reports, a structural approach 
may share the same basic deficiency of the antifraud rule 
approach: it decreases the value of analyst reporting to banks, 
which in turn will diminish the sponsorship of reporting on the 
part of banks, ultimately decreasing the flow of valuable 
information to the market.216 Thus, as with an antifraud rule, a 
structural remedy would most likely be disfavored under a law 
and economics approach. This is because other solutions 
(namely, either a market solution or a rule mandating 
disclosure of conflicts) appear to offer similar benefits, while 
imposing lower potential costs on the securities markets.  
Reliance on a structural remedy to the problem of 
analyst conflicts is neither compelled, nor precluded, by the 
philosophy of U.S. securities regulation. As Congress opted 
largely for disclosure and antifraud rules in promulgating a 
scheme of securities regulation, it cannot be said that failure to 
promote a structural solution is at odds with the U.S. 
regulatory approach. On the other hand, the Glass-Steagal Act 
(the Banking Act of 1933), which precluded commercial banks 
from engaging in investment banking and brokerage activities, 
provides clear precedent for a structural remedy were such a 
remedy deemed advisable.217 
  
 213 See Jacob et al., supra note 11, at 32; see also Choi & Fisch, supra note 193, 
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3. Summary of the Law and Economics Approach 
A law and economics approach could be expected to 
embrace a laissez-faire approach to analyst fraud, which would 
equate to a regime under which Rule 10b-5 liability would not 
be applicable to research analyst misstatements of opinion, and 
under which Regulation AC and Rule 2711 would not be 
present. That said, a rule of mandatory disclosure, under which 
analysts would be obliged to disclose their conflicts of interest, 
could be justified under law and economics grounds, given the 
benefits of such disclosure in comparison to its costs. A general 
antifraud rule applicable to analyst opinions and 
recommendations would be disfavored due to its chilling effect 
on analyst speech (both generally and, arguably, even with 
regard to the skewed opinions that help make the preparation 
and promulgation of research reports beneficial to the banks 
that issue them), and a structural remedy would most likely be 
rejected as violating the presumptively most efficient way (that 
is, the market-derived way) of generating research reports. 
C. Natural Law Analysis 
As previously acknowledged, the securities laws invite 
an economically oriented review by virtue of the important  
role they play in regulating the U.S. economy.218 There are, 
however, numerous other sources of reasoning or norms219  
to which one may turn for assistance in the interpretation and 
formulation of securities law.220 Of these, “natural law”  
is particularly appropriate and helpful. Although a 
comprehensive articulation and defense of natural law theory221 
  
 218 See supra Part III.B. 
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is beyond the scope of this Article, a brief overview of natural 
law theory, along with a more thorough presentation of those 
components of natural law thinking most applicable is in order 
and shall be provided.222 As shall be seen, a natural law 
approach to the problem of analyst conflicts differs significantly 
from a law and economics approach, in terms of both the ends 
pursued and the means employed. With regard to ends, 
although a natural law approach does not dismiss the 
important objectives of wealth maximization and efficiency,223 
natural law does not view wealth maximization as the ultimate 
(or only) societal goal. With regard to means employed, 
although a natural law approach does not dispute the force of 
self-interest, it recognizes other motivating factors upon 
human behavior and, as such, considers a wider range of 
possible mechanisms for influencing behavior. Taken together, 
the natural law approach provides a broader set of factors to 
consider in analyzing problems and proffering solutions. 
Moreover, as the values and objectives of a natural law 
approach are more congruent with the full set of values and 
objectives that originally animated the securities laws, so too 
are the solutions and approaches derived and endorsed via a 
natural law perspective.  
1. Why Natural Law? 
Before delving into a substantive overview of natural 
law theory, first consider the appropriateness of applying 
natural law thinking to a securities law analysis. There are at 
least five reasons for reviewing the problem of analyst conflicts 
in particular, and issues of securities law in general, via a 
natural law approach: 
First, it is not unfair for proponents of law and 
economics to demand a sparring partner whose arguments are 
predicated upon reason and objectivity rather than feelings, 
opinion, and subjectivity.224 Given the intellectual rigor and 
  
thinking, and does not purport to discuss or apply natural law per se. See JOHN FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 25 (1980).  
 222 For an overview of natural law methods of analysis, see generally Randy E. 
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rationality of natural law theory, and given the fact that for 
centuries it has been subject to scrutiny, evaluation, and re-
evaluation by some of the greatest minds the world has ever 
produced, no person of good will who professes a loyalty to 
reason can deny that natural law philosophy meets this 
standard.225 
Second, natural law reasoning has been a force in 
American political philosophy and jurisprudence since the 
inception of the United States to the present,226 and this alone 
suggests its appropriateness as a reference to assist in the 
understanding and resolution of American legal controversies. 
As Professor Kmiec has explained, “the American democracy 
is . . . rooted in the natural law.”227  
Third, although admittedly controversial in its 
application to certain other fields of law,228 natural law thinking 
is not often applied to economic-related fields of law such as 
securities regulation, nor, moreover, can natural law readily be 
categorized as “conservative” or “liberal,” “progressive,” or 
“reactionary” with regard to its application in such an area. 
Thus, application of natural law to the problem of analyst 
conflicts offers a perspective that is challengingly unfamiliar to 
many (if not most) in the field of securities law and, perhaps, 
less likely to be viewed askance or otherwise discounted as a 
vehicle for a particular political agenda. 
Fourth, as one proponent of natural law reasoning has 
explained, the use of natural law philosophy in legal analysis is 
a refreshingly ambitious alternative to those more “realistic” 
approaches to legal analysis employed in our “age of prosaic 
undertakings.”229 Put differently, a natural law approach, as 
opposed to a law and economics approach and some other 
modern theories of jurisprudence, allows us to once again focus 
the law explicitly on normative ends. 
Fifth, and perhaps most compelling, natural law 
thinking meshes extraordinarily well with the seminal values 
that produced the securities laws.230 For the virtues identified 
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by Congress as necessary to the ends of the securities laws 
(namely, moderation, honesty, and trustworthiness231), and the 
Second Circuit’s summary of the securities laws as ordered to 
“fairness,”232 echo principles of natural law (even if not 
consciously based upon such principles). And, whereas there 
are multiple methods of achieving the ends of the securities 
laws, the means chosen should be consonant with the values 
inherent in these laws. Since natural law philosophy shares the 
values previously identified as central to the securities laws, 
under a natural law approach, one shall be spared the 
predicament of a solution that furthers one of the ends of the 
securities laws while simultaneously undermining the laws’ 
other ends, values, or philosophical underpinnings. 
2. Natural Law Generally 
a. Natural Law Defined 
There are multiple competing theories of natural law.233 
Fortunately, much of what follows is shared by most (if not all) 
of these theories. Where divergences do occur, I have adopted 
what is commonly characterized as the “virtue ethics” school of 
natural law, which was originally developed by Aristotle and 
the ancient Greeks, and most thoroughly expounded upon and 
augmented by St. Thomas Aquinas.234 
At the core of natural law philosophy is the notion that 
reason can lead us to grasp certain fundamental truths about 
ourselves as human beings and, consequently, about society as 
well.235 Armed with the knowledge of these truths, further 
reasoning should enable us to derive rules and principles of 
conduct best suited to our human nature—that is, rules and 
principles of conduct that will promote individual virtue (or 
  
 231 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 232 SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 233 See generally Brian Bix, Natural Law Theory: The Modern Tradition, in 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 61-103 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 
2002) (providing an overview of the various theories of natural law). 
 234 For a short summary of virtue ethics, see Virtue Ethics, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2007), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
ethics-virtue/. For a more thorough treatment of the subject, see generally ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS (2d ed. 1998); RAYMOND J. DEVETTERE, 
INTRODUCTION TO VIRTUE ETHICS (2002). 
 235 See FINNIS, supra note 221, at 23-24. 
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morality) and societal justice.236 And by complying with these 
rules and principles (and only by complying with these rules 
and principles), human beings are capable of achieving 
“eudaimonia”—true human flourishing.237 
Natural law’s pedigree is long and illustrious; its 
various permutations can trace their roots back to ancient 
Greece, and its influence continues to be felt over the most 
important issues of our present day:  
[Natural law is] a philosophical theory stretching back to Socrates, 
Plato and Aristotle, propounded by the Stoics, developed anew by 
medieval churchmen like Aquinas, elaborated in secular terms by 
Protestant jurists like Grotius and Pufendorf, reshaped238 to justify 
“natural rights” by Locke, Montesquieu, Jefferson and Adams, and 
invoked in the cause of racial equality by Abraham Lincoln, the Rev. 
Martin Luther King Jr. and . . . Thurgood Marshall.239 
Finally, it should be noted that, although perhaps most 
often associated with Aquinas (who set forth the most 
complete, systematic exposition of natural law in the Summa 
Theologica240), natural law philosophy need not be predicated 
upon, and is not dependent upon, any particular religion or 
theology,241 as even natural law’s critics have come to observe.242 
  
 236 See D’ENTRÈVES, supra note 229, at 92-93, 110-11; see also FINNIS, supra 
note 221, at 23-24. 
 237 See Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 WIS. 
L. REV. 679, 689. 
 238 Arguably, “reshaped” is a euphemism here; perhaps a better term would be 
“radically transformed.” See, e.g., JACQUES MARITAIN, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL 
RIGHTS 59 (Doris C. Anson trans., 1943) (commenting that eighteenth-century natural 
law theory “more or less deformed” classical natural law theory). Nevertheless, the key 
point remains: the concept of a natural law, in its various permutations, has served as 
a wellspring of Western thought and inspiration. 
 239 Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1991, at 9; see also Bix, supra 
note 233, at 61-63. 
 240 See Bix, supra note 233, at 61-62; see also Michael P. Zuckert, Do Natural 
Rights Derive From Natural Law?, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 704 (1997) (“There 
were, to be sure, natural-law doctrines prior to Thomas Aquinas, but none so elaborate, 
so detailed, or so philosophically successful.”). 
 241 See A.P. D’ENTRÈVES, supra note 229, at 53 (noting Grotius’s “famous 
dictum that natural law would retain its validity even if God did not exist”). 
 242 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 187 (2d ed. 1994) (“Natural Law 
has, however, not always been associated with belief in a Divine Governor or Lawgiver 
of the universe, and even where it has been, its characteristic tenets have not been 
logically dependent on that belief.”). 
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b. Virtue and Eudaimonia 
As stated, from a natural law perspective, the ultimate 
goal (or end) of human existence is “eudaimonia”—a term used 
by Aristotle to denote true human flourishing (sometimes 
translated more simply as “happiness”).243 This immediately 
presents a contrast with the focus of law and economics, which 
does not recognize a unique end of human existence, but rather 
strives toward whatever ends an individual (or collection of 
individuals) chooses to pursue.244 Although both economics and 
natural law assume that individuals pursue “the good,” each 
defines “the good” quite differently. Under natural law 
philosophy, the good is an objective truth knowable by reason 
that is independent of an individual’s personal preferences; 
under economic theory, only preferences are knowable, and the 
good is defined as that which satisfies an individual’s 
preferences. Thus, the good has no meaning in economics 
without reference to preferences, whereas to natural law 
theorists what an individual prefers is not the same as what is 
truly good for him or her. So, although under natural law 
thinking, one can state that a particular individual prefers a 
particular thing that is not truly good for him or her, under 
economic thinking such a statement would be paradoxical.245  
Regarding the concept of efficiency, although a natural 
law approach would generally eschew wastefulness and share 
in the economist’s desire to promote efficiency and maximize 
wealth,246 natural law theory does not elevate efficiency and 
wealth maximization to the status that law and economics 
elevates them; rather, natural law theory subordinates the 
concerns of efficiency and wealth maximization to the 
  
 243 Mark A. Sargent, Utility, The Good, And Civic Happiness: A Catholic 
Critique of Law and Economics 19 (Villanova University School of Law, Public  
Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 2005-6, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=700684. 
 244 See supra text accompanying notes 162-164. Or, as some have suggested, 
law and economics generally views wealth (or utility) maximization as the end to which 
all human undertakings are (or should be understood to be) directed. E.g., Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law and Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 815, 825-30 (1990). 
 245 See MacIntyre, supra note 3, at 140-41 (“An Aristotelian theory of the 
virtues does therefore presuppose a crucial distinction between what any particular 
individual at any particular time takes to be good for him and what is really good for 
him as a man.” Professor Joseph Burke suggests that in economic parlance the natural 
law approach essentially separates an individual’s preferences from that individual’s 
welfare. 
 246 See supra note 223. 
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furtherance of objective happiness (eudaimonia).247 Similarly, 
under natural law thinking, happiness and true human 
flourishing “does not consist in amusement” (or material 
goods),248 but rather in living a life in accord with virtue.249 
To better understand why a virtuous life leads to true 
human flourishing (versus the satisfaction of subjective 
preferences or the maximization of wealth or utility), it helps if 
one is aware of the definition of virtue in the natural law 
tradition: the habit of doing “good.”250 “Good,” in turn, refers to 
that which is “to be done and aspired after” because of its 
consistency with human nature (and, consequently, its 
tendency to further humans toward their natural ends):251  
[G]ood is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the 
practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts 
for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle 
in the practical reason is one founded on the notions of good, viz., 
that good is that which all things seek after. Hence this is the first 
precept of law, that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be 
avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so 
that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s 
good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something 
to be done or avoided.252 
As alluded to previously, the ends of human existence 
under natural law thinking (and unlike law and economics) 
“are not arbitrary but rather determined by the dispositional 
  
 247 See Sargent, supra note 243, at 19; see also Luigino Bruni, The “Technology 
of Happiness” and the Tradition of Economic Science, 26 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 19, 
27 n.13 (2004).  
 248 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 194 (Roger Crisp trans. & ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) [hereinafter NICOMACHEAN ETHICS]. 
 249 See id.; see also Bruni, supra note 247, at 26-29, 40; Sargent, supra note 
243, at 19. It should be noted, however, that there is nothing necessarily inconsistent 
between the goal of natural law (eudaimonia) and the goals of wealth creation (or, 
moreover, the economic goals of securities regulation); a society in which investors are 
protected, confidence in the markets is maintained, and national savings, capital 
formation, and investment grow, is arguably establishing, at a minimum, the 
preconditions of true human flourishing. See John E. Coons & Patrick E. Brennan, 
Nature and Human Equality, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 287, 304 (1995) (noting the role of 
material goods in the achievement of human happiness); ALEJANDRO A. CHAFUEN, 
FAITH AND LIBERTY 7 (2003) (“One of the commonplaces in Aristotle is that most men 
need a certain amount of material goods in order to practice virtue.”); ARISTOTLE, 
POLITICS [1253b] 31 (reprint of 1905 Benjamin Jowett tr., Dover 2000) (“for no man can 
live well, or indeed live at all, unless he be provided with necessaries”). 
 250 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I-II, Q. 55, Art. 1. 
 251 Id. Q. 94, Art. 2. 
 252 Id. 
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properties which make up a human nature.”253 Via the 
application of “right reason,” individuals can distinguish 
between those acts that are good (i.e., in conformity with 
human nature and therefore lead toward true happiness) 
versus those acts that are evil (i.e., not in conformity with 
human nature and therefore lead away from true happiness).254  
In sum, therefore, natural law reasoning posits that:  
(1) human beings are naturally oriented toward an end 
(eudaimonia),  
(2) action taken in furtherance of this end is objectively good (and 
action taken in contradiction to this end is objectively evil);  
(3) via the use of reason, individuals can come to recognize that 
which is good from that which is evil; 
(4) the habit of choosing good (and avoiding evil) is called virtue (and 
its opposite called vice); and 
(5) living a virtuous life is living a life in accord with human nature; 
thus, the more virtuous an individual is, the more fully human that 
individual is, and the more he or she maximizes his or her human 
potential (and, consequently, his or her true happiness).255 
c. Social Virtues and Truth 
Particularly relevant to this Article is the natural law 
observation that “man by his nature is a social animal.”256 From 
this flows the understanding that many virtues are “social 
virtues” (since “it is by reason of them that man behaves 
himself well in human affairs”).257 As such, it is virtuous for 
human beings to act “in the service of the common weal,” and 
“to do well not only towards the community, but also towards 
the parts of the community, viz., towards the household, or 
even towards one individual.”258 It is not surprising, therefore, 
  
 253 ANTHONY J. LISSKA, AQUINAS’S THEORY OF NATURAL LAW 108 (Clarendon 
Press 1996). 
 254 Id. at 108-09. Although the application of right reason to particular 
situations is not always readily apparent, natural law theorists posit that certain broad 
generalizations can nevertheless be made. See D.Q. MCINERNY, A COURSE IN 
THOMISTIC ETHICS 242, 256 (1997). Thus, at a very high level, Aquinas identifies 
eternal happiness, self-preservation, procreation, community, and education as human 
“goods,” the pursuit of which “man has a natural inclination” and are “naturally 
apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit.” 
AQUINAS, supra note 250, Q. 94, Art. 2; see also RICE, supra note 139, at 52. 
 255 See NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 248, at 16. 
 256 AQUINAS, supra note 250, Q. 61, Art. 5. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. 
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to count among the virtues articulated within the natural law 
tradition exactly those same features that Congress 
highlighted as essential to properly ordered securities markets: 
moderation, honesty, trustworthiness, and/or fairness.259 
Additionally, the sina qua non of a securities market that is 
characterized by moderation, honesty, trustworthiness, and/or 
fairness is truth. With regard to truth, the Aristotelian natural 
law tradition condemns, as a perversion of communication that 
undermines the fabric of society, all forms of prevarication.260 
This condemnation results from a consideration of the purpose 
of communication and its role in society, along with an 
estimation of the consequences to a society that suffers from a 
lack of truthfulness.261 Thus, it can safely be concluded that 
  
 259 See C.S. LEWIS, ABOLITION OF MAN 51-61 (MacMillan 1947) (setting forth 
“illustrations of the Natural Law” that include admonitions concerning general 
beneficence, honesty, good faith and veracity, and justice). Because, as explained, right 
reason enables human beings to comprehend conduct proper to their end, it comes not 
as a surprise to the natural law theorist that so many peoples, across continents and 
centuries, have come to recognize these (and other) virtues as such. See id; Linda M. 
Sama & Victoria Shoaf, Reconciling Rules and Principles: An Ethics-Based Approach to 
Corporate Governance, 58 J. BUS. ETHICS 177, 183 (2005) (identifying truth, honesty, 
and fairness as “global hypernorms”); George Bragues, The Ancients Against the 
Moderns: Focusing on the Character of Corporate Leaders 27 tbl.1 (2006) (Paper 
Presented at the IESE Bus. School, Univ. of Navarra, 14th Int’l Symposium on Ethics, 
Business and Society, May 18-19, 2006) (setting forth Benjamin Franklin’s recognition 
of moderation, sincerity, resolution, and justice, among others, as virtues). 
 260 See Lying, in IX THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 469-70 (1910), available at 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09469a.htm (“Aristotle, in his Ethics, seems to hold 
that it is never allowable to tell a lie, while Plato, in his Republic, is more 
accommodating; he allows doctors and statesmen to lie occasionally for the good of 
their patients and for the common weal. Modern philosophers are divided in the same 
way. Kant allowed a lie under no circumstance.”). 
 261 Natural law theory is not alone in condemning deceit, which can also be 
condemned from perspectives of consequentialist and Kantian moral reasoning as well: 
Truth consists in a correspondence between the thing signified and the 
signification of it. Man has the power as a reasonable and social being of 
manifesting his thoughts to his fellow-men. Right order demands that in 
doing this he should be truthful. If the external manifestation is at variance 
with the inward thought, the result is a want of right order, a monstrosity in 
nature, a machine which is out of gear, whose parts do not work together 
harmoniously.  
. . . . 
The absolute malice of lying is also shown from the evil consequences which 
it has for society. These are evident enough in lies which injuriously affect 
the rights and reputations of others. But mutual confidence, intercourse, and 
friendship, which are of such great importance for society, suffer much even 
from officious and jocose lying. In this, as in other moral questions, in order 
to see clearly the moral quality of an action we must consider what the effect 
would be if the action in question were regarded as perfectly right and were 
commonly practiced. Applying this test, we can see what mistrust, suspicion, 
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natural law theorists would find research analysts who 
prevaricate or otherwise mislead the investing public in breach 
of the natural law.  
d. Positive Law and the Common Good 
It should not be concluded that the natural law’s 
imprecation of deceit demands an absolute prohibition on all 
false statements or opinions contained in research reports, 
regardless of the quantity and quality of accompanying 
disclosures. This leap—from natural law’s condemnation of 
prevarication to legal prohibition of prevarication—fails to 
recognize the important distinction between the natural law 
per se and positive (human) law within natural law theory.262 
Indeed, the proper role and scope of positive law under natural 
law theory is limited.263  
As expounded by Aquinas, human law exists not to 
prohibit every vice or wrongful act, but rather for the more 
modest purpose of promoting the “common good.”264 As with an 
individual, the “common good” does not consist merely of 
wealth or utility maximization, but rather, as Antonio 
Genovesi put it, a society that exhibits “pubblica felicita” 
(genuine public happiness).265 Given the interplay between 
virtue and happiness, the common good could also be thought 
of as “the creation of an economy and society that is more 
virtuous rather than less.”266 Again, the critical role that virtue 
plays here stems from the communitarian understanding of the 
individual in the natural law tradition: “No [person] is an 
island, sufficient unto himself . . . . All of the key social units 
  
and utter want of confidence in others would be the result of promiscuous 
lying, even in those cases where positive injury is not inflicted. 
Id. 
 262 See Barnett, supra note 222, at 667 (“While a natural-law analysis could be 
applied to a variety of questions, including the question of how human beings ought to 
act (for example, vice and virtue), the question of how society ought to be structured is a 
separate and quite distinct inquiry.” (emphasis in original)). 
 263 See AQUINAS, supra note 250, Q. 96, Art. 1-2. 
 264 See id. Q. 96, Art. 1; see also D’ENTRÈVES, supra note 229, at 84 (“[H]uman 
laws cover only those aspects of human behavior which imply a co-ordination with 
other men.”). 
 265 Bruni, supra note 247, at 26. 
 266 Mark A. Sargent, Utility, the Good and Civic Happiness: A Catholic 
Critique of Law and Economics, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 35, 55 (2005). 
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are very closely interrelated, and the moral health of any one of 
them depends upon the moral health of the others.” 267  
Since it is the common good that is the proper focus of 
the positive law, and since not every vice or wrongful act 
disturbs the common good to the same degree,268 enacted law 
ought to focus on forbidding only the “more grievous” vices, 
only those wrongful acts that threaten the common good.269 As 
Aquinas explained: 
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the 
majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Therefore human laws do 
not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the 
more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to 
abstain, and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the 
prohibition of which human society could not be maintained; thus 
human law prohibits murder, theft and the like.270 
With regard to the inculcation and development of 
virtues, here too the role of positive law from a natural law 
perspective is limited. For it is understood that “[l]aws cannot 
make men moral.”271 However, as discussed, it is also 
understood that individual virtue furthers the common good, 
and thus “the laws have a legitimate subsidiary role to play in 
helping people to make themselves moral.”272 To this end, 
proponents of natural law have argued that 
laws forbidding certain powerfully seductive and corrupting vices . . . 
can help people to establish and preserve a virtuous character by (1) 
preventing the (further) self-corruption which follows from acting out 
a choice to indulge in immoral conduct; (2) preventing the bad 
example by which others are induced to emulate such behavior; (3) 
helping to preserve the moral ecology in which people make their 
morally self-constituting choices; and (4) educating people about 
moral right and wrong.273 
It is also worth mentioning at this point the comments 
of the SEC’s first Chairman, Joseph P. Kennedy, whose 
  
 267 See MCINERNY, supra note 254, at 241; see also FINNIS, supra note 221, at 
165 (“Few will flourish, and no one will flourish securely, unless there is an effective 
collaboration of persons, and co-ordination of resources and of enterprises . . . . Such an 
ensemble of conditions of collaboration which enhance the well-being (or at least the 
opportunity of flourishing) of all members of a community is, indeed, often called the 
common good.”). 
 268 See ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL 47 (1993). 
 269 See AQUINAS, supra note 250, Q. 96, Art. 2. 
 270 Id. 
 271 GEORGE, supra note 268, at 1. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. 
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assessment probably still holds true today: “character exists 
strongly in the financial world,” and that the SEC need not 
“compel virtue,” but rather must “prevent vice.”274 The point 
being, the raw material of virtue is already present in the 
security industry’s participants; law is needed primarily to 
protect, preserve, and foster this virtue, largely by preventing 
its corruption—and not to create it out of whole cloth. 
Such efforts to use the law to help “people to make 
themselves moral” would appear particularly justified within 
the context of the social virtues. As touched upon previously, 
“[m]an is by nature a social animal, and this fact has 
immediate implications for the moral life”: 275 
Every man is a member of a community, and he is perfected in and 
through that community. And it is just here where the influence of 
law comes in. . . . Any community is a good community by reason of 
the fact that it has good laws. And a good community, St. Thomas 
argues, plays a vital role, especially through the medium of laws, in 
fostering, supporting, and sustaining the moral goodness of its 
individual members.276 
A final relevant implication flowing from an 
acknowledgment of the force of virtue is an appreciation of the 
fact that economic self-interest is not the only influence upon 
human activity.277 That is, a natural law theorist views virtue, 
and the tendency toward the good (including a tendency toward 
the common good), as fundamentally innate and therefore 
capable of motivating human conduct.278 Thus, in seeking 
solutions to problems, a natural law perspective would go 
beyond the paradigm of motivations based solely upon self-
interest and cost-benefit analysis—beyond “the economist’s 
standard reliance on a variety of taxes, subsidies, regulatory, 
and other pecuniarily oriented measures.”279 The natural law 
theorist would explore, for example, “[t]he government’s role in 
moral suasion, and [seek its] influence [to] mold the ethical 
  
 274 See Walsh, supra note 140, at 1058. 
 275 MCINERNY, supra note 254, at 246 (quoting AQUINAS, supra note 250, 
Q. 92, Art. 1). 
 276 Id. at 246 (quoting AQUINAS, supra note 250, Q. 92, Art. 1). 
 277 See Kapur, supra note 220, at 9 (“[T]here is a strong normative 
prescription of non-purely self-interest behavior in the great religious and cultural 
heritage of the world.”); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Catholic Social Thought and 
the Corporation 5, UCLA Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 03-20, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=461100. 
 278 See AQUINAS, supra note 250, Q. 63, Art. 1. 
 279 See Kapur, supra note 220, at 37. 
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climate of the society generally.”280 He or she would consider 
the capabilities of business leaders to set “the moral tone” of 
their respective industries.281 In short, a broader array of means 
would be considered under a natural law approach, not merely 
those means which appeal to an individual’s self-interest. 
Thus, in scrutinizing the problem of analyst conflicts of 
interest, a natural law approach will first consider whether the 
problem requires legislative circumscription, and, if so, 
whether the misconduct at issue would best be curbed by (1) 
simple prohibitions, and/or (2) efforts to increase the virtues 
and/or decrease the vices that are at the root of the misconduct. 
3. Application of Natural Law 
Not surprisingly, applying natural law principles to the 
problem of analyst conflicts yields results different from the 
application of law and economics. Whereas the economist views 
the problem as fundamentally one of inefficiency and/or market 
failure arising from competing interests, the natural law 
theorist views the problem as fundamentally a moral one: that 
of research analysts succumbing to temptations to prevaricate 
for profit.282 (Note the confluence of this diagnosis with that of 
the progenitors of the Securities Acts to the securities industry 
problems of their day.283) The natural law theorist will suggest 
solutions that protect the common good directly, by seeking to 
prevent the harm threatened by analyst misconduct, and 
indirectly, by seeking to inculcate or strengthen the virtues 
necessary to prevent such misconduct from reoccurring.284  
However, it should be noted at the outset that this 
difference does not necessarily indicate a trade-off of “wealth” 
in favor of “virtue,” for the economic benefits promised by a 
successful natural law approach would be significant. A regime 
  
 280 Id. at 38. 
 281 Id. at 47; see also Bragues, supra note 259, at 8.  
 282 Cf. Michael Prowse, Why Plastering over Capitalism’s Cracks Won’t Work, 
FIN. TIMES (London), July 13, 2002, at 2 (“The root problem is a loss of belief in 
objective ethical standards.”); William J. Bennett, Editorial, Capitalism and a Moral 
Education, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 2002, at C9 (identifying problems of corporate America 
as stemming from a mentality of “putting profits ahead of principle”). 
 283 See supra Part III.A. 
 284 According to the former President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, corporate America’s problems and scandals stem primarily from a failure to 
abide the fundamental commandment to “love thy neighbor.” William J. McDonough, 
Remarks at the September 11 Commemorative Service at Trinity Church (Sept. 11, 
2002), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2002/mcd020911.html. 
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characterized by increased virtue would “conduce considerably 
to the more efficient functioning of the economic system, 
especially when informational asymmetries are pervasive, as 
they invariably tend to be in modern, complex economies.”285 
And, as referred to previously, President Roosevelt and 
Congress, in addressing the economic crisis of the Great 
Depression, explicitly identified moral rehabilitation of the 
securities industry as a necessary prerequisite to the economic 
restoration of the securities markets.286 Indeed, studies have 
identified “the apparent decline in the ability to rely on the 
honesty of other people (including employees) as a factor in 
reduced U.S. productivity growth in the late 1970s.”287 
Therefore, there are even purely economic reasons for 
policymakers to seriously consider the insights of natural law. 
The ultimate natural law solution to the problem of 
research analyst conflicts of interest, therefore, even if merely 
aspirational, would be a regime in which regulation were 
unnecessary on account of the virtue of research analysts. 
Research analysts would continue to do their best to please 
their firm’s investment clients, but would resist the temptation 
of issuing reports that contain feigned opinions and fraudulent 
recommendations. But of course, if men were angels, we would 
need neither law nor government.288 Virtue, therefore, becomes 
a two-fold objective, pursued both because of its corrective 
function within the context of securities law and as a 
desideratum of natural law generally. Thus, a natural law 
approach would seek means to inculcate such virtue. As virtue 
is internal and choice-driven, it rarely (if ever) can be 
developed through coercion, and so an array of incentives 
conducive to its development would be preferable to injunctive 
measures.289 To that end, broader means of encouragement and 
exhortation, as discussed previously, would be mobilized.290 The 
hope would be that, via a sustained and coordinated appeal to 
the law already inscribed in the hearts of the market’s 
  
 285 See Kapur, supra note 220, at 45-46. 
 286 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 287 See Kapur, supra note 220, at 36-37. 
 288 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). But see ROBERT P. GEORGE, 
IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 107 (1999) (“[L]aw would be necessary to coordinate the 
behavior of members of the community for the sake of the common good even in a 
society of angels.”). 
 289 See GERMAIN GRISEZ, CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES 58-59 (1997). 
 290 See text accompanying notes 277-281. 
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participants,291 more punitive, coercive action to resolve the 
problem of analyst misconduct would be unnecessary. 
The failure of a system of such “virtue ethics,” based 
upon the natural law, would cause society instead (as it has) to 
resort to a system of ethics in which “the moral life . . . consists 
mainly of complying with society’s mandated code of 
conduct.”292 This is the legislative equivalent of stationing a 
police officer on every corner—a situation that is impracticable 
logistically, burdensome in cost, and awkward to free 
societies.293 Moreover, such rule-based ethical regimes have 
increasingly exhibited shortcomings, calling into question their 
efficacy to regulate conduct.294 Nevertheless, it has long been 
recognized that, as Professor Koniak has explained, “[n]orms 
maintained by private means (morality, ethics, religious 
principles) do not exist in a vacuum. They coexist, affect, and 
are affected by the norms of law.”295 The solution to societal 
problems, therefore, lies in fashioning the optimal mix of 
incentives and disincentives, coercive and non-coercive, in 
pursuit of the ends sought.296  
In the absence of an effective voluntary ethics regime, or 
some other non-coercive solution to the problem of analyst 
conflicts, the next question becomes whether the false 
portrayal of a researcher’s opinions is a wrongdoing of such 
magnitude that it justifies the imposition of legal 
intervention—including all the costs associated with such an 
  
 291 See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
 292 See Bainbridge, supra note 277, at 5. For an explanation of the distinction 
between a rules-based versus a principles-based system of ethics (which this statement 
implicates), see Sama & Shoaf, supra note 259, at 179-82. 
 293 Cf. HART, supra note 139, at 162 (“There is a limit to the amount of law 
enforcement that any society can afford, even when moral wrong has been done.”);  
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 288-330 (Phillips Bradley ed., 
Knopf 1993) (1835) (addressing “[p]rinciple causes which tend to maintain the 
democratic republic in the United States”).  
 294 See Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 212-14 (2003). See generally Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443 (2006) (addressing the repercussions of neglecting the role of 
morality in antitrust enforcement). 
 295 Koniak, supra note 294, at 225. 
 296 An example of creative, non-coercive means that could be employed to 
assuage the problem of analyst conflicts is provided by the aforementioned Global 
Settlement, which directed a portion of settlement proceeds to the funding of investor 
education and independent research. See supra text accompanying note 34. A better 
educated investing public, coupled with the provision of more independent research, 
could serve to temper bias in research reporting by reducing the effectiveness of 
disingenuous opinions; by virtue of their increased understanding coupled with more 
widely-available “second opinions” from independent research analysts, the public 
would, arguably, be less susceptible to fraudulent opinions. 
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imposition. Intentional deceit known to have such serious, 
harmful consequences for as many victims as analyst fraud 
ostensibly has had would, I suggest, readily cross the threshold 
of grievousness to justify legal intervention under natural law 
principles.297 And, assuming the failure of other means to curb 
the problem, it would seem that legal intervention over the 
issue would not only be justified, but essential. 
The last issue to consider, therefore, is the nature of the 
legal intervention most fitting to address the problem of 
analyst conflicts under a natural law approach.    
a. Laissez-Faire Approach 
A laissez-faire approach, relying upon market forces to 
check dishonesty, would not be favored because such an 
approach contemplates (and permits) the persistence of a 
certain amount of deception and dishonesty. The long-term 
impact of such a regime on society cannot be expected to be 
good, for it (1) acknowledges a role for dishonesty in the 
professional work of an entire class of individuals (research 
analysts) and (2) broadcasts the message that dishonesty is an 
expected part of certain commercial activity. 
b. Mandatory Disclosure 
It is unlikely that a natural law theorist would be 
comfortable with a rule protecting analysts from liability for 
dishonest opinions so long as full and accurate disclosure of 
their conflicts and all the underlying factual data accompanies 
such opinions. An argument justifying such a rule in terms 
palatable to a natural law proponent would stress that in the 
context of a full disclosure rule any harm to society resulting 
from feigned analyst opinions and recommendations would be 
minimal, and therefore not grievous enough to warrant 
legislative intervention.298 But the justification behind this 
approach focuses solely on the economic consequences of such 
deception, without regard to the severity of the moral 
implications to society. For the very fact of circumscribing the 
limits of the deception arguably institutionalizes it, implying 
  
 297 Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 277, at 4 (noting that “there is a limit at which 
forbearance ceases to be a virtue” and at which point “the state properly steps in. The 
prudential question is when forbearance becomes a vice.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 298 See supra Part III.C.2.d. 
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state approval thereof if contained within the established 
bounds. The coarsening effect of such a situation, both upon the 
individuals concerned and on society at large, would appear to 
warrant state intervention given the importance of 
truthfulness to the proper functioning of society.299  
Additionally, a disclosure-alone regime300 would also 
conflict with natural law principles by placing the common 
good (that is, the good of all investors and that of society as a 
whole) second to the particular good (that is, the benefit of 
those investors sophisticated enough to avail themselves of full 
disclosure and avoid being deceived by dishonest analyst 
opinions—even if these investors happen to be in the 
majority).301  From a natural law perspective, a regime designed 
merely to blunt the effects of deception (such as a disclosure 
rule by itself) would be inferior to a regime that prohibited 
deception per se.  
c. Antifraud Rule 
In light of the preceding, it unsurprisingly follows that  
a natural law approach would favor an antifraud rule 
applicable to analyst statements (including opinions and 
recommendations) over a rule simply mandating the disclosure 
of conflicts. And although this was not the conclusion reached 
as optimal under the general law and economics approach set 
forth previously (largely because of its costs, including the 
perceived threat to the vitality of the research-analyst 
industry),302 it should be noted that such an approach is 
nevertheless a recommendation made by some who subscribe to 
an economic approach to the law.303 For application of a strict 
antifraud rule to analyst statements could reap the benefits of 
a market-derived quantity of disclosure and provide a 
  
 299 See supra Part III.C.2.c. Admittedly, the argument in favor of state 
intervention becomes much weaker if the purported economic harms to society of 
analyst misconduct are significantly diminished. 
 300 Or, put differently, a regime in which analysts are shielded from liability 
for their feigned opinions if their research reports also contained sufficient cautionary 
disclosure as per the bespeaks caution doctrine and/or the PSLRA’s safe harbor rule. 
 301  Although it is laudable for an individual or group of individuals to 
voluntarily make personal sacrifices for the common good, it is not laudable to wrong a 
minority for the sake of the majority under natural law principles. Indeed, this would 
seem to violate the natural law prohibition on using the ends intended to justify the 
means employed. See McInerny, supra note 254, at 80. 
 302 See supra Part III.B.2.c. 
 303 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 166, at 1024. 
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safeguard against disclosure that was fraudulent or otherwise 
misleading.304 
d. Structural Approach 
Finally, a natural law theorist could be expected to 
heartily endorse structural correctives to the problem of 
analyst conflicts, such as those set forth by NASD’s Rule 
2711,305 in addition to other market-influencing efforts, such as 
the funding of investor education and independent research (as 
per the Global Settlement306). As explained, a natural law 
approach seeks to fashion an environment that encourages, 
rather than undermines, virtue.307 Investor education, and the 
increased availability of independent research, both serve to 
reduce the effectiveness (and harm) of biased research 
reporting and, consequently, should diminish the allure of 
dishonest reporting.308 And absent a structural solution, the 
analyst’s conflicted situation presents a constant and forceful 
temptation to falsify his or her opinions and recommendations 
in order to advance his or her own pecuniary self-interest. 
Although the ability of the law to coerce virtue is questionable 
to say the least,309 the law can certainly remove certain 
impediments to the development of virtue. Freed from such 
impediments, individuals are more likely to develop the habits 
of virtue, or at the very least are less likely to succumb to the 
temptations of vice.310 For this reason, a structural solution to 
the problem of analyst conflicts would coincide nicely with the 
ends of both the securities laws and natural law philosophy. 
  
 304 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1086. 
 305 See supra Part II.B.2.d. 
 306 See supra text accompanying notes 34, 296. 
 307 See supra Part III.C.2.d; see also GEORGE, supra note 268, at 44-45;  
cf. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudio Reis Socialis ¶ 36 (Dec. 30, 1987),  
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/ 
hf_jp-ii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialis_en.html (“ ‘Sin’ and ‘structures of sin’ are 
categories which are seldom applied to the situation of the contemporary world. 
However, one cannot easily gain a profound understanding of the reality that confronts 
us unless we give a name to the root of the evils which afflict us.”). 
 308 See supra note 296. 
 309 See supra note 289 and accompanying text. The concept of “coerced” virtue 
is arguably a contradiction in terms. Cf. Barnett, supra note 222, at 669 (“Although 
principles of natural-law ethics can be used to guide one’s conduct, they should not be 
enforced coercively by human law if doing so would violate the moral space or liberty 
defined by natural rights.”). 
 310 See GEORGE, supra note 268, at 27, 44.  
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4. Summary of the Natural Law Approach 
Thus, from a natural law perspective, a laissez-faire 
solution to the problem of analyst conflicts would be rejected, 
and a rule merely requiring disclosure of such conflicts would 
likewise be deemed insufficient. Instead, the natural law 
theorist would endorse an antifraud rule barring the 
misstatement of analyst opinions and, perhaps even more 
enthusiastically, endorse a structural remedy that would 
reduce, if not eliminate, the problematic conflicts of interest 
themselves. 
Lastly, one cannot ignore those who have questioned the 
utility of natural law reasoning on the ground that it fails to 
provide a certain, clear method of generating solutions to real-
world problems.311 It is admittedly the case that “the natural 
law does not determine once and for all the perfect scheme 
of . . . regulation. A number of different schemes . . . are 
consistent with the natural law.”312 However, natural law 
philosophy does provide the policy maker with principles that 
guide his or her decision-making, and application of these 
guiding principles can lead a policy maker to favor one 
potential remedy to a problem over another. In light of this, the 
flexibility left open to the policy maker by natural law 
reasoning is an advantage rather than a disadvantage to its 
use. Finally, it should be noted that, at least based upon an 
examination of the research analyst conflicts of interest 
problem, the mainstream law and economics approach does not 
appear any more determinate than the natural law approach. 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. securities laws were predicated upon an 
appreciation of virtue and vice. Their interrelated objectives 
and concerns included (1) the promotion of a fairer, more 
virtuous securities industry, (2) the protection of the individual 
investor, and (3) the good health of capital markets. Over time, 
in no small part due to the advance of law and economics 
thinking, the first of these objectives has been all but forgotten, 
and some scholars today even question the second. What is 
needed in order to recover respect for the entirety of concerns 
  
 311 See, e.g., Walter J. Walsh, The Fearful Symmetry of Gay Rights, Religious 
Freedom, and Racial Equality, 40 HOW. L.J. 513, 548 (1997). 
 312 GEORGE, supra note 288, at 108 (using “traffic regulation” as an example). 
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that spawned the U.S. securities regulatory regime is an 
approach to securities regulation that shares these concerns. In 
natural law philosophy we have such an approach. 
Via the examination of a particular securities law 
problem—that of research analyst conflicts of interest—this 
Article has attempted to demonstrate the benefits of a natural 
law approach to securities regulation. Unlike the economic 
approach, which favored solutions not entirely consonant with 
the values or full range of objectives of U.S. securities law, the 
natural law approach favored solutions consistent with all 
these values and objectives. The high value placed on veracity 
within the natural law tradition, in addition to the tradition’s 
recognition that efforts should be undertaken to remove or 
reduce those root influences that tempt wrongdoing, coincide 
well with U.S. securities regulation in both theory and practice. 
Also coinciding is the perceived importance of moral character 
and virtue. 
But the differences between a natural law approach and 
a law and economics approach should not be unduly inflated. 
As each approach is grounded in an understanding of human 
nature and behavior (albeit, an understanding that at times 
diverges), there is room for significant agreement between 
them. Additionally, the analytical power of the law and 
economics approach cannot be gainsaid. Perhaps the optimal, 
eventual result of this inquiry would be the proper integration 
of the economic approach to law within the broader framework 
of natural law thinking. 
